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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code' is a web of complex rules that
sometimes ensnares unwary taxpayers and their money. At the
web's center lurks a spider whose motto announces its intention to
tax income "from whatever source derived."' 2 However, because the
economy is itself a complex creature of differing business arrange-
ments and transactions, the web, if it is to catch every tax creature,
must also be complex.3
One of the primary areas of tax code complexity is subchapter
K.' A partnership, as defined in subchapter K, includes nearly
every sort of enterprise organization other than a corporation,
trust, or estate.' In other words, partnership, as a tax concept, is a
1. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, will be referred to hereinafter as
"IRC" or "Code". References to earlier versions of the Code will be specifically identified as
such.
2. IRC § 61(a) (1986) provides:
(a) GENERAL DEFINITION - Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross
income means all income from whatever source derived,
IRC § 61(a).
3. Michael D. Rose & John C. Chommie, Federal Income Taxation, § 1.05 (West, 3d
ed 1988) ("Rose, Taxation"):
The complexity of the federal income tax law has generated considerable discussion.
It has been said that the law is unfair by placing a premium on costly expertise,
thereby diverting legal and accounting talent that could otherwise be devoted to more
important tasks. Moreover, persons are forced to make and structure personal and
business decisions based on the tax laws. Some of the criticisms reflect the complexi-
ties of a highly developed society with a federal revenue structure that is a product of
the nation's economic, political, and social forces. Other criticism reveals an almost
passionate desire for certainty, and some criticism is the result of frustrations with
the political system.
Rose, Taxation at § 1.05.
4. The partnership provisions of the Code are, located in Subtitle A - Income taxes;
Chapter 1 - Normal Taxes and Surtaxes; Subchapter K Partners and Partnerships. Sub-
chapter K includes sections 701 through 761.
5. IRC § 761(a) (1986) provides:
(a) PARTNERSHIP. - For purposes of this subtitle, the term 'partnership' includes a
syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through or
by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and
which is not, within the meaning of this title, a corporation or a trust or estate. Under
regulations the Secretary may, at the election of all the members of an unincorpo-
rated organization, exclude such organization from the application of all or part of
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sort of catch-all term that may be applied to organizations not spe-
cifically defined as corporations, trusts or estates. This expansive
definition of partnership exists outside the several states' defini-
tions, and is wholly independent of state law.6 Consequently, a
wide array of organizations with many differences and individual
idiosyncracies are classed as partnerships under the Code.
The foundation of partnership analysis, in both the tax and the
non-tax context, is built upon the aggregate and entity theories of
partnership. Both theories have found expression in taxation of
partnership problems. Income and losses received by a partnership
"pass through"'7 the partnership to the partners, without being
taxed at the partnership level.8 In this respect the partnership may
be regarded as an aggregation of individuals.9 Partnership tax prin-
ciples also require taxable income to be computed at the partner-
this subchapter, if it is availed of -
(1) for investment purposes only and not for the active conduct of a business,
(2) for the joint production, extraction, or use of property, but not for the pur-
pose of selling services or property produced or extracted, or
(3) by dealers in securities for a short period for the purpose of underwriting,
selling, or distributing a particular issue of securities, if the income of the
members of the organization may be adequately determined without the com-
putation of partnership taxable income.
IRC § 761(a).
6. Rose, Taxation at § 9.02 (cited in note 3). This point is illustrated by the authors
when they note that:
A partnership is defined in sections 761(a) and 7701(a)(2) as an unincorporated or-
ganization, by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried
on; it includes a syndicate, group, pool, or joint venture. The foregoing definition con-
siderably expands the meaning of a partnership under state law. Furthermore, any
restrictions imposed by state law on the use of the partnership form will not prevent
partnership characterization for federal income tax purposes. (citations omitted)
Id.
7. Donald J. Weidner, The Existence Of State And Tax Partnerships: A Primer, 11
Fla St U L Rev 1, 27 (1983) ("Weidner, Primer"). "Because there is no tax due at the
partnership level, the purpose of the partnership return is to indicate how tax results of
partnership operation are 'passed through' to the partners and allocated among them by
their partnership agreement." (citations omitted). Weidner, Primer at 27.
8. IRC §701 (1986) provides:
A partnership as such shall not be subject to the income tax imposed by this chapter.
Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for income tax only in their
separate or individual capacities.
IRC §701.
9. Donald J. Weidner, A Perspective to Reconsider Partnership Law, 16 Fla St U L
Rev 1, 4 (1988) ("Weidner, Perspective"). This article described the traditional common law
aggregate approach as "one which declined to recognize the partnership as an organization
with a separate legal personality. The aggregate approach viewed the partnership as nothing
more than a conduit for the collection of'individuals it embraced." Weidner, Perspective at
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ship level prior to the determination of the individual partner's
share of that income.10 This calculation is reflective of the entity
theory of partnership taxation. These two disparate methods of
thinking about partnerships illustrate the aggregate and entity
principles of partnership theory in partnership taxation."
Together the aggregate and entity theories form the structure
upon which the web of partnership Code sections is spun. The two
theories meet at a point marked by the death of a partner and
defined by those Code sections that address income in respect of a
decedent.
Income in respect of a decedent is a concept that evolved12 to
account for items of income that, but for the death of a taxpayer,
would have been reportable by the deceased taxpayer. 3 In general,
"income in respect of a decedent," or IRD, are amounts to which a
decedent is entitled, but which were not properly includible in
her 4 income while she was alive.' 5 Accordingly, the term includes:
10. IRC § 702(b) (1986) provides:
(b) CHARACTER OF ITEMS CONSTITUTING DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE. The
character of any item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit included in a part-
ner's distributive share under paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a) shall be
determined as if such item were realized directly from the source from which realized
by the partnership, or incurred in the same manner as incurred by the partnership.
IRC § 702(b).
11. Weidner, Perspective at 4 (cited in note 9). "The law of partnerships has long
been characterized by efforts to identify those issues to be resolved in accord with the entity
theory of partnerships and those to be resolved in accord with the aggregate theory of part-
nerships. This dichotomy has long existed under state law, and has more recently come to
exist for federal income tax purposes." Id.
12. Prior to 1934, income earned but not yet paid was not taxed to the person who
earned it or to his successor in interest. In the Revenue Act of 1934 Congress required the
accrual of all income owed to the deceased, regardless of the accounting system used by the
deceased. See Helvering v. Estate of Enright, 312 US 636 (1941). That approach resulted in
the bunching of income in the last return of the deceased. To eliminate that bunching prob-
lem, Congress enacted the predecessor to the current section 691. See Rose, Taxation at §
8.18 (cited in note 3).
13. Rose, Taxation at § 8.18 (cited in note 3). "Congress enacted the predecessor of
section 691 in 1942 to allocate income and deductions not received or accrued before death
in the usual tax sense to the decedents estate or to other persons receiving such items after
the decedent's death." Id.
14. For purposes of convenience the author will use the feminine pronoun throughout
this article. That decision is based upon the feminine characters described in the hypotheti-
cal that is used in the article.
15. Treas Reg § 1.691(a)-1(b) (1965) provides:
In general, the term 'income in respect of a decedent' refers to those amounts to
which a decedent was entitled as gross income but which were not properly includible
in computing his taxable income for the taxable year ending with the date of his
death or for a previous taxable year under the method of accounting employed by the
decedent.
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accrued income of a cash-basis taxpayer; 6 income of an accrual-
basis taxpayer that accrues solely by reason of her death;, and in-
come to which the decedent had a contingent claim at the time of
her death.
18
Application of the income in respect of a decedent concept is
nowhere more difficult than when the taxpayer is a partner, be-
cause income in respect of a decedent principles must be applied
through, and reconciled with, subchapter K' 9 partnership provi-
sions. The presence of both aggregate and entity theories of part-
nership taxation in subchapter K appears to clash or merge, de-
pending on your perspective, in their application to IRD of a
partner. They clash in that items defined as partnership unrealized
receivables, 0 which are not within the purview of income in re-
spect of a decedent outside the partnership context, may be con-
verted into such items by virtue of their inclusion in the partner-
ship entity. And yet they merge in that once the items are
determined to be income in respect of a decedent, they may then
pass through the partnership to the deceased partner's successor in
interest pursuant to an aggregate view of the partnership. In other
words, the partnership may be split into part entity and part ag-
gregate based upon the nature of an asset rather than upon any
normative principle of taxation. That is either a clash of partner-
ship principles or a merger of complementary characteristics, as
this article will explore.
This article will examine the framework upon which the web of
partnership taxation has been spun. The purpose of this inquiry is
to resolve the tension between aggregate and entity partnership
theories as they are applied upon the death of a partner. In the
Treas Reg § 1.691(a)-l(b).
16. Tress Reg § 1.691(a)-1(b)(1) (1965). This term includes:
(1) All accrued income of a decedent who reported his income by use of the cash
receipts and disbursements method;
Tress Reg § 1.691(a)-1(b)(1).
17. Treas Reg § 1.691(a)-1(b)(2) (1965). This term includes:
(2) Income accrued solely by reason of the decedent's death in case of a decedent who
reports his income by use of an accrual method of accounting;
Tress Reg § 1.691(a)-l(b)(2).
18. Tress Reg § 1.691(a)-1(b)(3) (1965). This term includes:
(3) Income to which the decedent had a contingent claim at the time of his death.
Treas Reg § 1.691(a)-1(b)(3).
19. Treas Reg § 1.691(a)-1(b). This regulation further refers the reader to sections
736 and 753 and the regulations thereunder for "income in respect of a decedent" in'the
case of a deceased partner. Treas Reg § 1.691(a)-1(b).
20. See note 37 for a definition of unrealized receivables.
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course of this inquiry it will become apparent that aggregate part-
nership theory provides the best analysis of income in respect of a
decedent upon the death of a partner. However, further examina-
tion of specific partnership assets will show that both theories are
subordinated to the overarching principles of recognition of income
and its corollary, the preservation of basis. In other words, norma-
tive principles that guide all substantive tax questions will super-
sede state law principles of partnership law for the purpose of
resolving questions concerning specific assets embedded in the
partnership on the death of a partner.
The methodology employed in examining this partnership prob-
lem will be to first examine the Code, strictly construing its provi-
sions for income in respect of a decedent. Aggregate and entity
partnership theory will then be explored to determine if one or
both adequately explains the way in which partnership assets are
treated upon the death of a partner. Unrealized receivables, so-
called "hot assets," will then become the focus of this inquiry."
Aggregate partnership theory, under superior tax principles, will be
used to resolve the question of proper treatment of unrealized re-
ceivables. Individual hot assets will then be examined under in-
come in respect of a decedent principles as applied through the
partnership organization.
II. THE STATUTORY WEB
A. Income In Respect Of A Decedent Generally
Income in respect of a decedent, or IRD, requires the deceased's
successor in interest to include in gross income items received by
the successor and not accounted for on any return of the de-
21. "Hot assets" are so named because they generate ordinary income upon the dis-
position of a partnership interest. Section 751 treats the proceeds of such a disposition as
ordinary income to the extent that any portion of the proceeds corresponds to an amount
received in exchange for the "hot asset". Section 751(c) defines the assets that will generate
ordinary income upon the occurrence of any of the events listed in section 751(a).and
751(b).
The ultimate success of such innovative uses of partnerships may depend on the tax
planners' ability to avoid the clutches of section 751(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.
This section states that a partner will recognize ordinary income whenever he sells or
exchanges unrealized receivables or substantially appreciated inventory. These are
known as 'hot assets.'
See David Joy, Randall Hahn, and Allan Karnes, The Problem of Hot Assets in Farm Part-
nerships, 1985 SIU L Rev 655, 656 (1985). See also Rodman v Commissioner, 542 F2d 845,
856 (2d Cir 1976) which noted that "there could, for example, have been so-called 'hot as-
sets,' namely unrealized receivables or appreciated inventory." Rodman, 542 F2d at 856.
Vol. 31:1
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ceased.22 Section 691(a)2" ensures that items of income which were
owed to the deceased taxpayer, but unpaid on the date of her
death, will nevertheless be reported as income on the return of the
successor in interest to that income.24
22. Treas Reg § 1.691(a)-2(a) (1957) provides:
(a) Under section 691(a)(1), income in respect of a decedent shall be included in the
gross income, for the taxable year when received, of -
(1) The estate of the decedent, if the right to receive the amount is acquired by
the decedent's estate from the decedent;
(2) The person who, by reason of the death of the decedent, acquires the right
to receive the amount, if the right to receive the amount is not acquired by the
decedent's estate from the decedent; or
(3) The person who acquires from the decedent the right to receive the amount
by bequest, devise, or inheritance, if the amount is received after a distribution
by the decedent's estate of such right.
These amounts are included in the income of the estate or of such persons when
received by them whether or not they report income by use of the cash receipts and
disbursements method.
Treas Reg §1.691(a)-2(a).
23. IRC § 691(a) (1986) provides:
(a) INCLUSION IN GROSS INCOME. -
(1) GENERAL RULE. - The amount of all items of gross income in respect of
a decedent which are not properly includible in respect of the taxable period in
which falls the date of his death or a prior period (including the amount of all
items of gross income in respect of a prior decedent, if the right to receive such
amount was acquired by reason of the death of the prior decedent or by be-
quest, devise, or inheritance from the prior decedent) shall be included in the
gross income, for the taxable year when received, of:
(A) the estate of the decedent, if the right to receive the amount is ac-
quired by the decedent's estate from the decedent;
(B) the person who, by reason of the death of the decedent, acquires the
right to receive the amount, if the right to receive the amount is not
acquired by the decedent's estate from the decedent; or
(C) the person who acquires from the decedent the right to receive the
amount by bequest, devise or inheritance, if the amount is received after
a distribution by the decedent's estate of such right.
IRC § 691(a).
24. Rose, Taxation at § 8.18 (cited in note 3) provides:
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1934, income received after the death of a cash method
taxpayer escaped taxation completely. To preclude this, Congress enacted legislation
that, in effect, required the accrual at death of all income and deduction items re-
gardless of the accounting method used by the decedent. Accrual was interpreted by
the Supreme Court (citation omitted) to embrace any income item capable of valua-
tion whether or not it had accrued in the accounting sense. As a result of this inter-
pretation, a decedent's final return sometimes contained a substantial amount of
bunched income that significantly increased the tax liability under the graduated sys-
tem. To alleviate this bunching in a decedent's final return, Congress enacted the
predecessor to section 691 in 1942 to allocate income and deductions not received or
accrued before death in the usual tax sense to the decedent's estate or to other per-
sons receiving such items after the decedent's death.
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Section 691 was enacted as an extension of prior law under sec-
tion 126 of the 1939 Code.2 5 Congress wanted to avoid the bunch-
ing or upgrading of income in the final return of a decedent but, of
course, could not allow the income to escape income taxation. The
concept of income in respect of a decedent was added to the law to
solve that problem.26
There are four primary characteristics of income in respect of a
decedent that distinguish it from other forms of income.27 First,
the item of income must have been earned by the taxpayer, or due
to the taxpayer because of her status, and but for her death would
have been realized by the decedent as gross income without further
effort.28 An example of such an item would be an amount due to- a
cash basis taxpayer with a solo accounting business. Consider the
case of Arachne who earned $20,000.00 through her business of
providing accounting services, $10,000.00 of which was unpaid on
her death. On payment, her successor in interest would include the
amount as ordinary income on her return.
The example also illustrates the second characteristic of IRD,
that the item of income was not properly includible on the dece-
dent's final tax return.2 9 Arachne was a cash method taxpayer, and
as such the amounts due from clients, even though earned by her
prior to death, were not properly includible on her final return.
The third characteristic of IRD is that the recipient of the right
to income must have acquired it solely by reason of the death of
25. Beyond the question of inclusion in income of items that were earned but not yet
paid to the deceased taxpayer, there is the problem of "bunching" the income on the final
return of the deceased. This bunching would force the taxpayer into a higher bracket and
tax the item of income at a higher rate than would otherwise necessarily be the case. In
solving this problem Congress removed the income from the return of the deceased and
placed it on the return of the recipient in the year of receipt. See Finance Committee Re-
port, S Rep No 1622, 83d Cong, 2d Sess 5015 (1954):
[The section 126] provisions were added by the Revenue Act of 1942 and were
designed to overcome the preexisting requirement that there be included in the in-
come of a decedent for the taxable period in which his death occurred all the income
accrued up to the date of his death. In order to overcome the "bunching" of all such
income in the decedent's final return, the 1942 amendments made the income accrued
solely by reason of the decedent's death taxable to the actual recipient at the time
the income was received.
S Rep No 1622 at 5015.
26. S Rep No 1622 at 5015.
27. Alan S. Acker, 32 Tax Management, Estates, Gifts, and Trusts Portfolios A-9
(BNA 3d ed 1990) ("Acker, Tax Management").




the taxpayer who created it."0 Arachne's successor acquired the
right to $10,000.00 solely by reason of the death of Arachne.
The example also illustrates the fourth characteristic in that the
item which passed on the death of the taxpayer was not a property
right and therefore not subject to a step up in basis under section
1014.1 It is this characteristic that will be called into question in
the partnership context because an unrealized receivable owed to a
partnership may become a right to property when the partnership
is viewed as an entity that includes an unrealized receivable. As we
will see, an interest in a partnership is treated as a property right
of the holder of that interest both under state law and under fed-
eral tax law. If the partnership entity is respected, an interest in a
partnership may include an IRD component that may be trans-
formed into a property right subject to a step up in basis under
section 1014.32 On the other hand if the partnership entity is ig-
nored pursuant to an aggregate theory of partnership law, the IRD
component may retain its characteristic as an item of income
rather than a property right.
The interaction of IRD and partnership taxation occurs in three
different circumstances, all initiated by the death of a partner.
First the deceased partner's interest may remain in the hands of a
successor, allowing the continuation of the partnership with the in-
clusion of the successor as a new partner.33 Second, there may be a
sale of the partnership interest with the firm continuing as an
ongoing business. And finally there may be a liquidation of the
partnership. 4 The presence of unrealized receivables, as that term
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. IRC § 1014 (1986).
33. The Uniform Partnership Act section 31(4) requires the dissolution of the old
partnership and the formation of a new partnership under state law upon the death of one
partner. It also provides for a continuation of the business under section 42. The Code spe-
cifically allows for the continuation of the SAME partnership, even if a partner withdraws
or dies. See IRC § 708 (1986) which provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE. - For purposes of this subchapter, an existing partnership
shall be considered as continuing if it is not terminated.
(b) TERMINATION. -
(1) GENERAL RULE. - For purposes of subsection (a), a partnership shall be
considered as terminated only if- (A) no part of any business, financial opera-
tion, or venture of the partnership continues to be carried on by any of its
partners in a partnership, or
(B) within a 12-month period there is a sale or exchange of 50 percent or more
of the total interest in partnership capital and profits.
IRC § 708.
34. See Stephen A. Lind, et al, Fundamentals of Partnership Taxation 359 (Founda-
1992
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is defined in section 751(c), 85 in each of those three circumstances
is the subject of this inquiry.
Most, if not all, cash basis partnerships will maintain an account
for unrealized receivables that keeps track of amounts owed to the
partnership which have not yet been paid.5 6 Section 751(c) defines
partnership unrealized receivables to include such amounts and ex-
pands upon the simple definition to include whole classes of items,
such as farm land, stock in certain foreign corporations, and other
items that, but for the Code, would not be considered unrealized
receivables.
3 7
tion, 3d ed 1992) ("Lind, Fundamentals") which noted:
When a partner dies, there is no repose for his partnership interest, which remains in
the purgatory that we have come to know as Subchapter K. At the partner's death,
his interest in the partnership can: survive and be acquired by his successor in inter-
est; be sold pursuant to a buy-sell agreement taking effect at the partners death; or
be liquidated by the partnership under a preexisting agreement.
Lind, Fundamentals at 359.
35. For the definition of unrealized receivables see note 37 and accompanying text.
36. Lind, Fundamentals at 241-242 (cited in note 34):
Unrealized receivables generally include rights (contractual and otherwise) to pay-
ment for goods and services which have not previously been included in income, pro-
vided, in the case of goods, that the sales proceeds would be treated as received from
the sale or exchange of non-capital assets.
Id.
37. IRC § 751(c) (1986) provides:
(c) UNREALIZED RECEIVABLES.- For purposes of this subchapter, the term 'un-
realized receivables' includes, to the extent not previously includible in income under
the method of accounting used by the partnership, any rights (contractual or other-
wise) to payment for -
(1) goods delivered, or to be delivered, to the extent the proceeds therefrom
would be treated as amounts received from the sale or exchange of property
other than a capital asset, or
(2) services rendered, or to be rendered.
For purposes of this section and sections 731, 736, and 741 such term also includes
mining property (as defined in section 617(f)(2)), stock in a DISC (as described in
section 992(a)), section 1245 property (as defined in section 1245(a)(3)), stock in cer-
tain foreign corporations (as described in section 1248), section 1250 property (as de-
fined in section 1250 (c)), farm land (as defined in section 1252(a)), franchises, trade-
marks, or trade names (referred to in section 1253(a)), and an oil, gas, or geothermal
property (described in section 1254) but only to the extent of the amount which
would be treated as gain to which section 617(d)(1), 995(c), 1245(a), 1248(a), 1250(a),
1252(a), 1253(a), or 1254(a) would apply if (at the time of the transaction described in
this section or sections 731, 736 or 741, as the case may be) such property had been
sold by the partnership at its fair market value. For purposes of this section and
sections 731, 736, and 741, such term also includes any market discount bond (as
defined in section 1278) and any short term obligation (as defined in section 1283)
but only to the extent of the amount which would be treated as ordinary income if (at
the time of the transaction described in this section or section 731, 736, or 741, as the
case may be) such property had been sold by the partnership.
IRC §751(c).
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For purposes of illustration, consider the accounting partnership
of Arachne and Athene (A and A)."8 The partnership is on the cash
basis and was formed on January 1, 1980. Arachne died on April
15, 1990, when there were $10,000.00 in unpaid fees due from cli-
ents of the firm. Additionally, the partnership owned farm land (as
described in section 1252)39 on the date of death. These facts will
be applied throughout this article to explain the application of
both the law and the theory of income in respect of a decedent in
the partnership context.
B. Partnership Income In Respect Of A Decedent
Courts interpreting section 69140 have said that the first require-
ment for application of the statute is whether "the decedent had a
right to the income.''41 If the decedent had a right to the income at
the time of death, later receipt of the income by a successor in
interest is included in income of the successor under section 691.2
In our illustration, if Arachne had been in business on her own, the
unpaid fees would clearly be income in respect of a decedent to her
estate or heir or other successor in interest. The farm land would
not be IRD, because it fails to satisfy the first characteristic of in-
come in respect of a decedent. It is not income that would be real-
ized by the decedent without any further effort. Farm land is not
covered by the theory because it is not income, even though it may
have appreciated in value over the life of the decedent. It does not
38. The names for this example come from the Greek myth of Arachne and Athena.
See Robert Graves, Vol One, The Greek Myths, (Penguin Books, 1960) ("The Greek
Myths"):
Arachne, a princess of the Lydian Colophon - famed for its purple dye - was so skilled
in the art of weaving that Athene herself could not compete with her. Shown a cloth
into which Arachne had woven illustrations of Olympian love affairs, the goddess
searched closely to find fault but, unable to do so, tore it up in a cold, vengeful rage.
When the terrified Arachne hanged herself from a rafter, Athene turned her into a
spider - the insect she most hates - and rope into a cobweb, up which Arachne
climbed to safety.
The Greek Myths at 98.
39. IRC § 1252(a)(2) (1986) provides:
(2) FARM LAND - For purposes of this section 'farm land' means any land with
respect to which deductions have been allowed under sections 175 (relating to soil
and water conservation expenditures) or 182 (relating to expenditures by farmers for
clearing land).
IRC § 1252(a)(2).
40. IRC § 691 (1986).
41. Halliday v US, 655 F2d 68, 71 (5th Cir 1981). See also Trust Company of Geor-
gia v Ross, 392 F2d 694 (5th Cir 1967).
42. IRC § 691 (1986).
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constitute an amount of income which the decedent had a right to
receive prior to death.
Income in respect of a decedent as applied to partners is specifi-
cally addressed in section 691(e).43 This section directs the reader
to subchapter K section 753"' which defines partnership IRD as
amounts includible in the gross income of a successor in interest
under section 736(a).' 5 That section says that payments made in
liquidation of the interest of the deceased partner are to be consid-
ered IRD. This purely statutory analysis of a deceased partner's
IRD requires the examination of three sections in Subchapter K,
each applied in sequence upon the issues raised by application of
its predecessor. Judicial interpretation of section 69146 has taken a
more expansive view of the area, and will be explored later in this
article.
The cornerstone of this statutory analysis is section 736(a)."'
That section is limited to payments made in liquidation of the in-
terest of a deceased partner. The remaining two possibilities,
namely the continuation of the partnership by the successor in in-
terest or the sale of the partnership interest to a third party, are
not addressed in section 736(a).11 Statutorily, no partnership item
qualifies as IRD unless it is a section 736(a) payment.'" There is no
43. IRC § 691(e) (1986) provides:
(e) CROSS REFERENCE. -
For application of this section to income in respect of a deceased partner, see sec-
tion 753.
IRC § 691(e).
44. IRC § 753 (1986) provides:
The amount includible in the gross income of a successor in interest of a deceased
partner under section 736(a) shall be considered income in respect of a decedent
under section 691.
IRC § 753.
45. IRC § 736(a) (1986) provides:
(a) PAYMENTS CONSIDERED AS DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE OR GUARANTEED
PAYMENT. - Payments made in liquidation of the interest of a retiring partner or a
deceased partner shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be considered -
(1) as a distributive share to the recipient of partnership income if the amount
thereof is determined with regard to the income of the partnership, or
(2) as a guaranteed payment described in section 707(c) if the amount thereof
is determined without regard to the income of the partnership.
IRC § 736(a).
46. IRC § 691 (1986).
47. IRC § 736(a) (text quoted in note 45).
48. Id.
49. Lind, Fundamentals at 367 (cited in note 34):
Section 753 is a specific statute that is limited to characterizing section 736(a) pay-
ments received by a deceased partner's successor in interest as IRD. It does not apply
if the partner's interest continues in the hands of a successor or is sold pursuant to a
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alternative statutory method for determining IRD. Some commen-
tators have named this seeming statutory dead-end the "exclusiv-
ity problem." 0 By its terms, section 736(a)51 does not apply to ei-
ther sale of the partnership interest or continuation of the
partnership by the successor in interest of the partnership, the
only two alternative possible circumstances other than liquidation.
A strict construction of the Code, therefore, requires a dead stop at
section 736(a),51 resulting in IRD treatment only for amounts paid
in liquidation under that section. Continuation of the partnership
or sale of the partnership interest are outside the reach of statu-
tory income in respect of a decedent because there is no Code pro-
vision that describes IRD in either of those circumstances.
The A and A partnership illustration, when analyzed under a
purely statutory analysis, would generate IRD only if there was a
liquidating distribution to Arachne's successor in interest. In other
words any payment received in liquidation of Arachne's partner-
ship interest would include Arachne's share of the unrealized re-
ceivables. That amount would be treated as IRD under section
736(a).5 ' The unpaid fees would be IRD and thus ordinary income
to the recipient upon the section 736(a) liquidating payment. The
farm land might also be considered IRD because section 736(b)(2)
specifically treats all section 751(c) 54 unrealized receivables as
within the section 736(a) definition of distributive share of part-
nership income upon payment to a deceased partner's successor in
interest."' Farm land is an unrealized receivable under section
pre-existing buy-sell agreement.
Id.
50. Acker, Tax Management at A-36 (cited in note 27). The author explains:
b. The Exclusivity Problem
It can be argued, then, that, except for § 736(a) amounts, there can be no IRD in
respect of a deceased partner. This proposition, the acceptance of which would pro-
duce results that would be hard to justify, has been rejected by the regulations and
the courts.
Id.
51. IRC § 736(a) (text quoted in note 45).
52. Id.
53. Section 736(b)(2)(A) makes it clear that section 736(a) payments are ordinary
income to the extent they contain unrealized receivables as defined in section 751(c).
54. IRC § 751(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 37).
55. IRC § 736(b) (1986) provides:
(b) PAYMENTS FOR INTEREST IN PARTNERSHIP
(1) GENERAL RULE. - Payments made in liquidation of the interest of a
retiring partner or a deceased partner shall, to the extent such payments (other
than payments described in paragraph (2)) are determined, under regulations
1992
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751(c) and could theoretically be viewed as IRD if the payment in
liquidation of Arachne's interest included a payment for farm land.
This analysis will be explored in more detail later in this article.
Continuing with the analysis of the proper treatment of
Arachne's interest upon her death when there is a liquidation of
her interest under section 736(a), the question now focuses on the
fourth characteristic of income in respect of a decedent, namely
that it is not a property right subject to a step up in basis. In other
words, the question now becomes one of the proper way in which
to treat unrealized receivables in computing basis of the partner-
ship interest of the deceased partner.
The passage of the partnership interest from the deceased to her
successor in interest permits an adjustment to the basis of partner-
ship property with respect to the transferee partner. The general
rule, found in section 743(b), se is that the basis of partnership
property with respect to the successor in interest is equal to the
value of the partnership interest acquired by the successor in in-
terest. The value of the partnership interest acquired on the death
of a partner is its value at the date of her death, increased by her
estate's or other successor's share of partnership liabilities, and re-
duced to the extent that such value is attributable to items consti-
tuting IRD.5 7 Accordingly, it is important to determine the extent
prescribed by the Secretary, to be made in exchange for the interest of such
partner in partnership property, be considered as a distribution by the part-
nership and not as a distributive share or guaranteed payment under subsec-
tion (a).
(2) SPECIAL RULES. - For purposes of this subsection, payments in exchange
for an interest in partnership property shall not include amounts paid for -
(A) unrealized receivables of the partnership (as defined in section
751(c)), or
(B) good will of the partnership, except to the extent that the partner-
ship agreement provides for a payment with respect to good will.
Id.
56. IRC § 743(b) (1986) provides:
(b) ADJUSTMENTS TO BASIS OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY. - In the case of
a transfer of an interest in a partnership by sale or exchange or upon the death of a
partner, a partnership with respect to which the election provided in section 754 is in
effect shall -
(1) increase the adjusted basis of the partnership property by the excess of the
basis to the transferee partner of his interest in the partnership over his pro-
portionate share of the adjusted basis of the partnership property, or
(2) decrease the adjusted basis of the partnership property by the excess of the
transferee partner's proportionate share of the adjusted basis of the partner-
ship property over the basis of his interest in the partnership.
IRC § 736(b).
57. Treas Reg § 1.742-1 (1956) provides:
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of IRD in a partnership interest, not only because it is subject to
ordinary income treatment by the recipient in a liquidating distri-
bution, but also because the basis of the partnership interest will
be computed by subtracting items of IRD.
The capstone of this statutory analysis approach is the applica-
tion of section 1014(a).18 That section provides the successor in in-
terest of the deceased partner with a stepped-up basis for the part-
nership interest acquired from the decedent. The only exception to
section 101451 that might prevent the operation of the general rule
from stepping up the basis of the partnership interest is section
1014(c), 60 which prohibits the application of the general rule to
property that is IRD under section 691.61 Accordingly, the basis
provisions of Subchapter K send the taxpayer back into Sub-
chapter J6 2 for a brief stop at section 69163 before returning again
to the Subchapter K analysis.
The successor to Arachne's partnership interest will obtain a ba-
sis in the partnership interest equal to its fair market value with-
out regard to unrealized receivables. Under section 743,64 the basis
in partnership property may be adjusted to reflect the value of the
partnership interest that Arachne's successor acquires. Liquidating
distributions paid to the successor will therefore be measured
The basis of a partnership interest acquired from a decedent is the fair market value
of the interest at the date of his death or at the alternate valuation date, increased by
his estate's or other successor's share of partnership liabilities, if any, on that date,
and reduced to the extent that such value is attributable to items constituting income
in respect of a decedent (see section 753 and paragraph (c)(3)(v) of §1.706-1 and par-
agraph (b) of § 1.753-1) under section 691. See section 1014(c).
Treas Reg § 1.742-1.
58. IRC § 1014(a) (1986) provides:
(a) IN GENERAL. - Except as otherwise provided in this section, the basis of prop-
erty in the hands of a person acquiring the property from a decedent or to whom the
property passed from a decedent shall, if not sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed
of before the decedent's death by such person, be -
(1) the fair market value of the property at the date of the decedent's death,
IRC § 1014(a).
59. IRC § 1014 (1986).
60. IRC § 1014(c) (1986) provides:
(c) PROPERTY REPRESENTING INCOME IN RESPECT OF A DECEDENT. -
This section shall not apply to property which constitutes a right to receive an item
of income in respect of a decedent under section 691.
IRC § 1014(c).
61. IRC § 691 (1986).
62. IRC Subchapter J concerns estates, trusts, beneficiaries and decedents and covers
section 641 through 692.
63. IRC § 691.
64. IRC § 743 (1986).
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against that basis for purposes of determining gain. Under section
1014(c),65 unrealized receivables will not receive any step up in ba-
sis, and amounts representing Arachne's share of unrealized receiv-
ables will be treated as ordinary income, whether or not they are
actually paid to the successor in interest.11
Based upon a statutory analysis alone, only those cases of liqui-
dated partnership interests under section 736(a)67 would contain
IRD, and all other cases would be entitled to the step up in basis
of the entire partnership interest under section 1014(a),6 8 and a
subsequent step up in basis for the partnership property under
section 743(b). 8 Section 73670 is the key. There will be no IRD
income to a successor in interest under section 75371 and no denial
of a step up in basis under section 1014(c),'7  unless there is a liqui-
dation of interest under section 736(a) .7  Furthermore, payments
made in liquidation of interest, and thus considered to be IRD,
include payments attributable to unrealized receivables, as defined
in section 751(c), 7' and good will.
78
Without reference, for the moment, to the expansive definition
of unrealized receivables contained in the flush language of section
65. IRC § 1014(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 60).
66. Rev Rul 68-215, 1968-1 CB 312 provides:
Where a partner dies before the close of the partnership taxable year and under the
partnership agreement his estate, as his 'successor in interest,' is entitled to receive
his share of the partnership's profits remaining undistributed at the time of his
death, the deceased partner's distributive share of partnership taxable income for the
partnership taxable year in which the decedent's last taxable year ended is includible
in the return of the decedent's estate. This is the case even though his executor, pur-
suant to the terms of his will, assigned to the beneficiaries fractional interests in any
right which the decedent had to partnership profits realized after the beginning of the
year of the decedent's death.
Rev Rul 68-215, 1968-1 CB 312.
67. IRC § 736(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 45).
68. IRC § 1014(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 58).
69. IRC § 743(b) (1986) (text quoted in note 56).
70. IRC § 736 (1986).
71. IRC § 753 (1986) (text quoted in note 44).
72. IRC § 1014(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 60).
73. IRC § 736(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 45).
74. IRC § 751(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 37).
75. IRC § 736(b)(2) (1986) provides:
(2) SPECIAL RULES. - For purposes of this subsection, payments in exchange for an
interest in partnership property shall not include amounts paid for -
(A) unrealized receivables of the partnership (as defined in section 751(c)), or
(B) good will of the partnership, except to the extent that the partnership
agreement provides for a payment with respect to good will.
IRC § 735(b)(2).
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751(c),! e the term refers generally to income which has been
earned, but not yet included in income, by the taxpayer. 7 There is
no doubt that such an item would be IRD in the hands of an indi-
vidual under section 691(a). 8 Yet a strict entity interpretation of
the Code and of the underlying partnership interest would extin-
guish the individual components of that interest. Entity theory
does not inquire into the components of the entity. It is uncon-
cerned with the constituent bundle of rights and responsibilities
that make up the entity. Pure entity theory would consider the
partnership interest to be a single, discrete asset regardless of the
presence of what would otherwise be IRD outside the partnership.
In the case of the A and A accounting partnership, accounts re-
ceivable earned prior to Arachne's death and paid out on liquida-
tion will be IRD to the successor in Arachne's interest. That result
would also occur if Arachne had been in business for herself acting
as a sole accounting practitioner. Her death would mean that the
unrealized receivables would be IRD to the successor in interest
when collected.79
As a sole practitioner, the unrealized receivables of Arachne's ac-
counting business belong to her personally. However, as a partner
in A and A, the unrealized receivables earned by Arachne and
Athene belong to the partnership, not Arachne, although she
would have gained the benefit of sharing in the receivables of the
partnership had she lived. Nevertheless, the item is an asset of the
partnership, not of Arachne. The partnership agreement between
the two accountants would describe how the proceeds from the
business are to be divided. In other words, the accounts receivable
are the property of an entity. The benefits flowing from the ac-
counts receivable to the equity holders is determined at the entity
level and is not simply a flow through of monies earned separately
by the members of the firm.
If the partnership agreement provides for the liquidation of
Arachne's interest on her death, then, pursuant to the statutory
76. IRC § 751(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 37).
77. Treas Reg § 1.691(a)-l(b) (1965) (text quoted in note 15).
78. IRC § 691(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 23).
79. Treas Reg § 1.691(a)-2(a)(1) (1960) provides:
Inclusion in gross income by recipients. - (a) Under section 691(a)(1), income in re-
spect of a decedent shall be included in the gross income, for the taxable year when
received, of -
(1) The estate of the decedent, if the right to receive the amount is acquired by
the decedent's estate from the decedent;
Treas Reg § 1.691(a)-2(a)(1). See also Treas Reg § 1.691(a)-2(b) examples 1 through 5.
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analysis contained in section 736(a), 80 liquidating payments to the
successor in interest would be IRD through section 75381 and
691(e). 2 There would be no step up in basis to the successor in
interest by virtue of section 1014(c),8 s and the estate would owe
income tax on .the portion of the liquidating distribution corre-
sponding to the unrealized receivables.
If the partnership agreement provides for the continuation of
the partnership or the possible purchase of the partnership inter-
est, then there would be no liquidation of the interest of a de-
ceased partner under section 736(a).8 " Due to the absence of a sec-
tion 736(a)85 liquidation, the statutory analysis described above
appears to be inapplicable. 6 In our example, the sale of Arachne's
interest to a third party or the continuation of the business by the
successor to Arachne's interest s7 would not be within the statutory
framework of IRD because there would not be a liquidation within
the meaning of section 736(a).88 To the "consternation of strict
constructionists, ' '8 9 however, courts have extended IRD treatment
80. IRC § 736(a) (1986).
81. IRC § 753 (1986).
82. IRC § 691(e) (1986).
83. IRC § 1014(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 60).
84. IRC § 736(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 45).
85. IRC § 736(a).
86. Arthur B. Willis, Paul Little and Donald McDonald, Problems on Death, Retire-
ment or Withdrawal of a Partner, 17 NYU Institute on Federal Taxation 1033, 1041-1042
(1959) ("Willis, Problems). The authors note:
2. A's estate's basis for A's interest is its estate tax value of $60,000 plus $500, his
share of partnership liabilities, less 'income in respect of a decedent' which appar-
ently varies.
c. If B and C purchase A's interest, or if A's successor continues as a partner,
the values of goodwill and unrealized receivables are not income in respect of a
decedent, resulting in an interest basis of $60,500. This results apparently from
a statutory oversight. The Internal Revenue Service may be expected to oppose
this result.
Willis, Problems at 1041-1042.
87. The example breaks down to some extent at this point because it concerns per-
sonal services provided by the partners themselves. I ask the reader to assume that a pur-
chaser or successor would be capable of providing those services and that Athene would
agree to continuation of the business with that successor or purchaser.
88. IRC § 736(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 45).
89. Lind, Fundamentals at 367 (cited in note 34).
To the consternation of strict constructionists of the code, the Service has contended
that section 753 is not the exclusive means of classifying the decedent's interest in
partnership assets as IRD. Applying an aggregate theory, the courts have concurred
with the Service, in effect creating an additional category of IRD that is not specifi-
cally contemplated by section 753. The Quick Trust and Woodhall cases, below,
adopted this approach with respect to a continuation of a partnership interest and a
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to cases in which there is a sale or continuation of the partnership
interest."0 This expansion of the IRD concept appears to shatter
the partnership entity and is supported instead by an aggregate
view of partnership taxation.
III. EXPANSION OF PARTNERSHIP INCOME IN RESPECT OF A
DECEDENT BEYOND THE CODE
A. Judicial Interpretation
Courts have been very critical of the rigid entity analysis of part-
nership IRD that a strict statutory approach requires.91 With some
art, they have avoided the seemingly required statutory result in
favor of a consistent treatment of simple unrealized receivables in
the hands of an individual and in the hands of a partnership."2 The
two cases that recognize a non-statutory approach to IRD in the
contexts of a sale of the partnership interest and the continuation
of the partnership interest are Woodhall v Commissionere3 and
Quick Trust v Commissioner,"' respectively.
In Quick Trust, the estate of George E. Quick and its successor
to the partnership interest of the decedent, the George Edward
Quick Trust, relying upon entity partnership theory, challenged
the Service's position that any of the partnership interest con-
tained IRD attributable to the accounts receivable allocable to the




91. George Edward Quick Trust v Commissioner, 54 Tax Ct 1336, 1343 aff'd 444 F2d
90 (8th Cir 1972). The tax court noted "that petitioner's position [that only payments in
liquidation of a partnership interest can be IRD under the Code] has been the subject of
extensive legal analysis and that it has some support among the legal pundits." Quick Trust,
54 Tax Ct at 1343.
92. See Id at 1343, and Chrissie H. Woodhall v Commissioner, 28 Tax Ct Mem Dec
1438, aff'd 454 F2d 226 (9th Cir 1972).
93. WoodhaUl, 28 Tax Ct Mem Dec (CCH) at 1443, Tax Ct Mem Dec (P-H) 1 69,279
at 1556-69. (cited in note 92).
94. Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ctat 1343, explained that " the partnership provisions of
the 1954 Code are comprehensive in the sense that they are detailed. But this does not
mean that they are exclusive, especially where those provisions themselves recognize the
interplay with other provisions of the Code." Id.
95. Id at 1342. The petitioner argued "that the partnership provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 adopted the entity theory of partnership, that the plain meaning of
those provisions, insofar as they relate to the question of basis, requires the conclusion that
the inherited partnership interest is separate and distinct from the underlying assets of the
partnership, and that, therefore, section 691, and consequently section 1014(c), has no appli-
cation herein." Id.
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to adjust the basis of partnership property under section 743(b).es
Pursuant to those sections the partnership adjusted the taxpayer's
basis in the accounts receivable from zero to an amount roughly
equal to one half of the fair market value of its accounts receivable
at the death of Mr. Quick. ee Pursuant to this approach, the ac-
counts receivable would generate no ordinary income to the tax-
payer on collection, because the taxpayer's basis in the accounts
receivables would equal or exceed the amount collected.
The Tax Court analyzed the issue by asking'00 whether the ac-
96. Id at 1340.
97. There is no substantial difference between the 1954 version of section 754 and the
current 1986 version. See IRC § 754 (1986) which provides:
If a partnership files an election, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the
Secretary, the basis of partnership property shall be adjusted, in the case of a distri-
bution of property, in the manner provided in section 734 and, in the case of a trans-
fer of a partnership interest, in the manner provided in section 743. Such an election
shall apply with respect to all distributions of property by the partnership and to all
transfers of interests in the partnership during the taxable year with respect to which
such election was filed and all subsequent years. Such election may not be revoked by
the partnership, subject to such limitations as may be provided by regulations pre-
scribed by the Secretary.
IRC § 754.
98. There is no substantial difference between the 1954 version of the code and the
1986 version. See IRC § 743(b) (1986) which provides:
(b) Adjustment to basis of partnership property. - In the case of a transfer of an
interest in a partnership by sale or exchange or on the death of a partner, a partner-
ship with respect to which the election provided in section 754 is in effect shall-
(1) Increase the adjusted basis of the partnership property by the excess of the
basis to the transferee partner of his interest in the partnership over his pro-
portionate share of the adjusted basis of the partnership property, or
(2) decrease the adjusted basis of the partnership property by the excess of the
transferee partner's proportionate share of the adjusted basis of the partner-
ship property over the basis of his interest in the partnership.
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, such increase or decrease shall
constitute an adjustment to the basis of the partnership property with respect
to the transferee partner only.
IRC § 743(b).
99. Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ct at 1340-1341. The court observed that " On the facts of
this case, the net result of this adjustment was to increase the basis of the accounts receiva-
ble to the partnership from zero to an amount slightly less than one-half of their face
value." Id.
100. Id at 1341. The court indicated that:
The issue before us is whether the foregoing adjustment to basis was correctly made.
Its resolution depends upon the determination of the basis to the estate of its interest
in the partnership, since section 743)b)(1) allows only an "increase [in] the adjusted
basis of the partnership property by the excess of the basis to the transferee partner
of his interest in the partnership over his proportionate share of the adjusted basis
of the partnership property." (emphasis added). This in turn depends upon whether,
to the extent that "the basis to the transferee partner" reflects an interest in underly-
ing accounts receivable arising out of personal services of the deceased partner, such
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counts receivable component of the partnership interest was IRD
under section 691,101 thereby coming within the exception to the
general rule of section 1014(a)10 2 found in section 1014(c). 103 Peti-
tioner argued that the Code embodies an entity theory of partner-
ship.104 Accordingly, the inherited partnership interest is distinct
from the assets which compose that interest. Pursuant to such an
approach, petitioners argued for the court to apply section
1014(a)'0° and cut off the application of sections 691106 and
1014(c). 0 7
The Service argued in favor of an aggregate approach to partner-
ship basis.108 In this case, one of the aggregate rights was a right to
receive income in respect of a decedent, namely, section 691
IRD.'0 9 The Service pointed out that had the partnership been on
the accrual basis, or if Mr. Quick had been a sole proprietor, or
even if the accounts receivable had been those of a corporation,
they would certainly have been taxable as ordinary income.110 In-
clusion of the right to receive income in a partnership ought not to
change that result, argued the Service.'
In reaching its decision, the court noted that although the part-
nership provisions of the Code are comprehensive, they are not ex-
interest constitutes income in respect of a decedent under section 691(a)(1) and (3).
In such event, section 1014(c) comes into play and prohibits equating the basis of
Quick's partnership interest with the fair market value of that interest at the time of
his death under section 1014(a). (emphasis by the court)
Id.
101. There is no substantial difference between the 1954 version and the 1986 version
of section 691, other than the redesignation of section 691(f) as section 691(e). See IRC §
691 (1986).
102. IRC § 1014(a) (1954) provides:
(a) IN GENERAL. - Except as otherwise provided in this section, the basis of prop-
erty in the hands of a person acquiring the property from a decedent or to whom the
property passed from a decedent shall, if not sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed
of before the decedent's death by such person, be the fair market value of the prop-
erty at the date of the decedent's death, or, in the case of an election under section
2032 or section 811(j) of the Internal Revenue Code, of 1939 where the decedent died
after October 21, 1942, its value at the applicable date prescribed by those sections.
IRC § 1014(a).
103. There is no difference between the 1954 version and the 1986 version of section
1014(c). See IRC § 1014(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 60).
104. Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ct at 1342.
105. IRC § 1014(a) (1954) (text quoted in note 102).
106. IRC § 691 (1954).
107. IRC § 1014(c) (1954).
108. Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ct at 1342.
109. IRC § 691 (1954).
110. Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ct at 1342.
111. Id.
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clusive. " 2 Judge Tannenwald described the Code's analysis of in-
come in respect of a decedent in the context of a deceased partner
as detailed but not complete, " and engaged in a policy analysis
that first focused on section 1014,114 and then moved on to section
691.115 Differing with "legal pundits," ' the court rejected the
strict construction of section 691(e)1 1 7 that requires entering a lab-
yrinth at whose end there is only liquidating payments made to a
deceased partner under section 736(a).118 Instead the court di-
rected itself to the predecessor of section 691,119 section 126120 of
the 1939 Code, and judicial precedent 21 regarding that section.
122
Those cases12 1 were interpreted to support the court's view that a
general partner's distributive share as received by his successor in
interest upon his death, to the extent it contains accounts receiva-
ble arising out of the rendition of personal services, constituted in-
come in respect of a decedent under the 1939 Code. 24 The court
noted that the legislative history of section 1014(c)1 25 included a
specific desire to continue the 1939 interpretation of IRD.128 Legis-
112. Id at 1343.
113. Id.
114. IRC § 1014 (1954).
115. Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ct at 1343 (cited in note 92).
116. Id at 1343, n 11. The court noted that "[the petitioner's position has been the
subject of extensive legal analysis and that it has some support among the legal pundits. See
Arthur B. Willis, Handbook of Partnership Taxation, 389-395 (1957); M. Carr Ferguson,
Income and Deductions in Respect of Decedents and Related Problems, 25 Tax L Rev 5,
100 et seq." Quick Trust at 1343, n 11.
117. IRC § 691(e) (1986) (text quoted in note.43).
118. IRC § 736(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 45).
119. IRC § 691 (1954).
120. IRC § 126 (1939) provides:
The amount of all items of gross income in respect of a decedent which are not prop-
erly includible in respect of the taxable period in which falls the date of this death or
a prior period shall be included in the gross income, for the taxable year when re-
ceived, of:
(A) the estate of the decedent, if the right to receive the amount is required by the
decedent's estate from the decedent ....
IRC § 126.
121. Mandel v Sturr, 266 F2d 321, 324 (2nd Cir 1959). The Mandel court observed
that "section 126 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 is high on the list of vaguely drafted
legislation in a field notoriously complex . Mandel, 266 F2d at 324.
122. Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ct at 1343.
123. United States v Ellis, 264 F2d 325 (2nd Cir 1959); Riegelman's Estate v Commis-
sioner, 27 Tax Ct 833, aff'd 253 F2d 315 (2d Cir 1958).
124. Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ct at 1342.
125. IRC § 1014(c) (1954).
126. Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ct at 1343, n 10. "According to the House committee report
at the time the 1954 Code was enacted, sec. 1014(c) 'makes explicit the rule of existing law.'
See HR No 1337, 83d Cong, 2d Sess, A267 (1954)." Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ct at 1343, n 10.
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lative history is also cited by the court to support its view that
sound tax policy requires unrealized receivables, whether or not





The Tax Court completed its analysis of the three possible dis-
positions of a partnership interest when it decided a case involving
the sale of a partnership interest by the estate of a deceased part-
ner. In Woodhall, the court was faced with a cash basis partner-
ship in the lathing and plastering business known as Woodhall
Brothers. " On the death of W. Lyle Woodhall, his estate sold his
interest to the surviving partner, Eldon Woodhall, in accordance
with the partnership agreement between the brothers. The court
held that payments received by the estate of the deceased partner
were income with respect to a decedent to the extent such pay-
ments were allocable to unrealized receivables and that the basis of
the partnership interest did not equal the amount received on its
sale because basis was the fair market value of the interest reduced
by IRD amounts locked into the unrealized receivables. 130 The
court restated its view that the application of section 691"s' is not
limited by the terms of section 691(f), 3 2 and should be applied
under a comprehensive interpretation of the Code.' The court
127. IRC § 736(a) (1954).
128. Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ct at 1343-44. The court indicated that:
Both the House and Senate committee reports specifically state that income rights
relating to unrealized receivables or fees are regarded "as severable from the partner-
ship interest and as subject to the same tax consequences which would be accorded
an individual entrepreneur." See HR No 1337, 83d Cong, 2d Sess, 71 (1954); S Rep
No 1622, 83d Cong, 2d Sess, 99 (1954). And the Senate Committee report adds the
following significant language.
The House bill provides that a decedent partner's share of unrealized receivables
are [sic] to be treated as income in respect of a decedent. Such rights to income are
to be taxed to the estate or heirs when collected, with an appropriate adjustment for
estate taxes. * * * Your committee's bill agrees substantially with the house in the
treatment described above but also provides that other income apart from unrealized
receivables is to be treated as income in respect of a decedent. (emphasis in the
original).
Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ct at 1343-1344.
129. Woodhall, Tax Ct Memo (P-H) 69,278 at 1550-69.
130. Id at 1556-69 - 69-1557.
131. IRC § 691 (1954).
132. IRC § 691(f) (1954). Section 691(f) was redesignated as section 691(e) by section
(1) of public law 88-570, Sept. 2, 1964.
133. Woodhall, Tax Ct Memo (P-H) 69,279 at 69-1556. The court preliminarily
noted "that the application of section 691 is not circumscribed in section 691(f) by the refer-
ence to section 753, and through that section to section 736(a). Rather, we view these latter
sections as supplementary. Nowhere in part II of Subchapter J (Income in Respect of Dece-
dents) is there language placing restrictions on the application of section 691 to Subchapter
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based its opinion on section 61,134 and found that to the extent
payments are allocable to unrealized receivables, those payments
are income in respect of a decedent.
135
Together, the Tax Court opinions in Quick Trust"3 6 and Wood-
hall1' 7 mark a departure from the statutory framework of the Code
and establish judicial parameters for defining partnership income
in respect of a decedent.' 8 The court's reliance on legislative his-
tory may be faulted for its expansion of congressional intent be-
yond matters actually considered by Congress to the point of
ascribing intent to matters Congress should have considered. 3 9
Nevertheless, the cases were decided more than twenty years ago
and have not been refuted by Congress in any way. Pursuant to
the so-called "reenactment doctrine,"' 40 they may fairly be viewed
K (Partners and Partnerships). Nor is there limiting language in Subchapter K." Id at 69-
1556.
134. IRC § 61 (1954) instructs: "[g]ross income means income from whatever source
derived." IRC § 61.
135. WoodhaU, Tax Ct Memo (P-H) 69,279 at 69-1556, held "section 61 states that
"gross income means income from whatever source derived" and, therefore, in computing
IRD, no distinction can be made as to whether the payments come from a partnership or
from an individual. The only question to be considered is whether in fact there is gross
income which may properly be considered as IRD. In the instant case we find and hold that
to the extent payments were allocable to unrealized receivables, said payments constitute
IRD." 22138
Id.
136. Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ct at 1336.
137. Woodhall, Tax Ct Memo (P-H) 69-279 at 69-1549.
138. William S. McKee, William F. Nelson, Robert L. Whitmire, Federal Taxation of
Partnerships and Partners, 23.03[2][c], at 23-24 (Warren, Gorham and Lamont, 2d ed
1990) ("McKee, Partnerships"). The author's overview concluded:
[c] Court-Established Items of Income in Respect of a Decedent
The Tax Court and two circuit courts of appeal have recognized the existence of a
third class of partnership IRD [section 736(a) payments and distributive share of
partnership interest are the first two classes] items by treating a decedent's interest
in zero-basis accounts receivable of a service partnership as IRD.
Mckee, Partnerships at 23-34.
139. See Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 Tex L Rev 819, 851 (1991) ("Livingston, Congress").
Professor Livingston has written an excellent analysis of the application of legislative his-
tory in the interpretation of the Code. One interesting point is that the Tax Court will apply
legislative history in an attempt to divine what Congress would have done had it considered
the question before the Court. That is in distinction from the general use of legislative his-
tory to determine what Congress intended on a point which it did consider. Such a broad
policy type of analysis may be justified in a triad approach suggested by Professor Living-
ston at page 872 of his article, and is very helpful in resolving the issues addressed in this
article.
140. All of the Code sections at issue in this analysis have been reenacted without
substantial change. The reenactment doctrine states that judicial and administrative inter-
pretations of reenacted laws are presumed to have been reviewed by Congress and affirmed
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as settled law concerning the sale of a deceased partner's interest
and the continuation of such an interest.
B. Administrative Interpretation
The general rule of Treasury Regulation section 1.736-1(a) pro-
vides that section 736(a) 1 1 only applies to payments made to a re-
tiring or deceased partner's successor in interest upon the liquida-
tion of the partnership interest." 2 Moreover the regulation
specifically provides that:
Section 736 and this section do not apply if the estate other successor in
interest of a deceased partner continues the partnership in its own right
under local law. Section 736 and this section apply only to payments made
by the partnership and not to transactions between the partners. Thus, a
sale by partner A to partner B of his entire one-fourth interest in partner-
ship ABCD would not come within the scope of section 736.
Accordingly, when the partnership is continued by the successor in
interest, there is no liquidating payment under section 736,"' as
interpreted by Treasury Regulation section 1.736-1(a).""
The only specific mention of IRD in the regulations under sec-
tion 736"'1 is found in Treasury Regulation section 1.736-1(c)," 6
and it is merely a cross reference to section 753.1" That section
refers the reader back to section 736(a)"18 for purposes of defining
IRD. 149
as correct. See Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich L Rev 87, 109 (1988)
for a comprehensive explanation of the reenactment doctrine. See also Lorillard v Pons, 434
US 575, 580 (1978) which suggested that "Congress is presumed to be aware of an adminis-
trative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-
enacts a statute without change." Lorillard, 434 US at 580..
141. IRC § 736(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 45).
142. Treas Reg § 1.736-1(a)(1)(i) (1965) explains:
(a) Payments considered as distributive share or guaranteed payment. (1)(i) Section
736 and this section apply only to payments made to a retiring partner or to a de-
ceased partner's successor in interest in liquidation of such partner's entire interest in
the partnership.
Treas Reg § 1.736-1(a)(1)(i).
143. IRC § 736 (1986).
144. Tres Reg § 1.736-1(a)(1)(i) (1965) (text quoted in note 142).
145. IRC § 736 (1986).
146. Treas Reg § 1.736-1(c) (1965). Subsection (c) of this regulation also provides a
cross reference to section 753 for treatment of payments under section 736(a) as income in
respect of a decedent under section 691.
Treas Reg § 1.736-1(c).
147. IRC § 753 (1986) (text in note 44).
148. IRC § 736(a) (1986) (text in note 45).
149. IRC § 753 (1986) (text quoted in note 44).
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The regulations under section 753 15 expand the concept of liqui-
dating payments to include payments made by a third party in ex-
change for rights to future payments under section 736(a). 151 To
the extent that the sale of a partnership interest by the successor
in interest of a deceased partner includes a payment by the pur-
chaser for rights to future payments under section 736(a), 15 Trea-
sury Regulation section 1.753-1(a) 15 3 requires those payments to be
considered IRD. This result is in accord with the Woodhall deci-
sion. 154 The regulations under section 753155 do not specifically ad-
dress the continuation of the partnership by a successor in interest,
other than to say that a deceased partner's distributive share will
be considered IRD. 56 Unrealized receivables in a cash method
partnership are not part of a partner's distributive share, and are
therefore beyond the scope of the regulation.
150. Id.
151. Treas Reg § 1.753-1(a) (1956) provides:
(a)Income in respect of a decedent under section 736(a) - All payments coming within
the provisions of section 736(a) made by a partnership to the estate or other successor
in interest of a deceased partner are considered income in respect of the decedent
under section 691. The estate or other successor in interest of a deceased partner
shall be considered to have received income in respect of a decedent to the extent
that amounts are paid by a third person in exchange for rights to future payments
from the partnership under section 736(a). When a partner who is receiving payments
under section 736(a) dies, section 753 applies to any remaining payments under sec-
tion 736(a) made to his estate or other successor in interest.
Tresas Reg § 1.753-1(a).
152. IRC § 736(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 45).
153. Treas Reg § 1.753-1(a) (1956) (text quoted in note 151).
154. See Woodhall, 28 Tax Ct Mem, Dec 1438, afrd 454 F2d 226 (9th Cir 1972). It
should be noted however, that Woodhall was decided in 1969, fifteen years after the promul-
gation of Treas Reg § 1.753-1(a). Yet the court did not even cite the regulation in support of
its holding. Instead the court relied on section 741 and the regulations thereunder that ad-
dress questions concerning the sale of a partnership interest.
155. IRC § 753 (1986) (text quoted in note 44).
156. Treas Reg § 1.753-1(b) (1956) provides:
Other income in respect of a decedent. When a partner dies, the entire portion of the
distributive share which is attributable to the period ending with the date of his
death and which is taxable to his estate or other successor constitutes income in re-
spect of a decedent under section 691. This rule applies even though that part of the
distributive share for the period before death which the decedent withdrew is not
included in the value of the decedent's partnership interest for estate tax purposes.
Treas Reg § 1.753-1(b).
Distributive share is defined in Tress Reg 1.704-1 and includes all items of income. How-
ever, unrealized receivables of a cash method partnership are not items of income until re-
ceived, and thus are not distributive shares within the meaning of Treas Reg 1.753-1(b). See
also United States v Bayse, 410 US 441, 448 (1973), in which the Court said that distribu-
tive share refers to proportionate share of income of the partnership. Accounts receivable of
a cash method partnership are not income until received. Bayse, 410 US at 448.
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In our example, the continuation of the A and A accounting
partnership by Athene and Arachne's successor in interest would
seem to be outside the scope of section 736(a) 157 by operation of
Treasury Regulation section 1.736-1(a). " Pursuant to the strict
statutory analysis, the absence of a liquidating payment under sec-
tion 736(a) 159 means that there is no IRD under section 691(e).1 60
The absence of IRD would permit the application of section
1014(a) 61 without the exception provided in section 1014(c).1
62
Arachne's successor would therefore take the partnership interest
with a stepped up basis under sections 754163 and 743(b).1
64
The sale of Arachne's interest would be treated differently under
the regulations if the sale included an amount paid for a future
right to a liquidating distribution. In that case, Treasury Regula-
tion section 1.753-1(a) 6 5 would require that payment to be treated
as having been received IRD through section 736(a). 66
C. Criticism Of Expansive IRD Theories
Some legal scholars have noted that the Code appears to limit
the items that can be treated as IRD in the partnership context.1
6 7
This so-called "exclusivity problem" can be succinctly stated as
the absence of statutory authority for IRD under any circum-
stances other than those described in section 736(a).6 8 Three
members of a Congressional advisory group on partnership taxa-
tion have stated their belief that unrealized receivables are not in-
come in respect of a decedent as to a purchaser or a successor to a
deceased partner.'69 They argued that the Code contains a "statu-
157. IRC § 736(a) (1986).
158. Treas Reg § 1.736-1(a) (1956).
159. IRC § 736(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 45).
160. IRC § 691(e) (1986) (text quoted in note 43).
161. IRC § 1014(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 58).
162. IRC § 1014(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 60).
163. IRC § 754 (1986) (text quoted in note 97).
164. IRC § 743(b) (1986) (text quoted in note 98).
165. Treas Reg § 1.753-1(a) (1956).
166. IRC § 736(a) (1986).
167. See Willis, Problems (cited in note 86) and Ferguson (cited in note 116). But see
McKee, Partnerships (cited in note 138).
168. IRC § 736(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 45). See Acker at A-36 (cited in note 27).
169. Willis, Problems at 1042 (1959) (cited in note 86):
If B and C purchase A's interest, or if A's successor continues as a partner, the values
of goodwill and unrealized receivables are not income in respect of a decedent ....
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tory oversight.' 7 0 A technical reading of the Code supports that
position.17 ' Moreover, other commentators have suggested that the
explicit nature of the relevant Code sections makes deviation from
the Code a "difficult problem of statutory construction". 172
Notwithstanding this difficulty, the Tax Court, as we have seen,
has construed the relevant Code sections to include unrealized re-
ceivables in IRD. To the extent that a departure from the four
corners of the Code may be justified, there should be a theoretical
basis for the result. Accordingly, this analysis must now turn to the
two primary partnership theories to aid in explaining the results
reached by the Tax Court. Either theory, or both used together,
should provide a coherent framework upon which to build the IRD
interpretation that catches unrealized receivables when they are
included in the assets of a partnership.
IV. ENTITY AND AGGREGATE PARTNERSHIP THEORIES
A. Non-Tax Partnership Theory
Before focusing on tax policy and legislative history it will be
helpful to analyze the two theories of entity and aggregate partner-
ship law in a non-tax context. In this way their virtues and vices
can be examined without the stress of tax consequences inherent
in either system.
At common law the partnership was not recognized as an organi-
zation with a separate legal personality.77 This view is illustrated
170. Id: "This results apparently from a statutory oversight. The Internal Revenue
Service may be expected to oppose this result." Id.
171. Carolyn K. Tenen, Tax Problems of Service Partnerships, 16 NYU Institute on
Federal Taxation 137, 163 (1958) ("Tenen, Tax Problems"). This author concluded that
"under the existing law, a good technical argument could be made that a sale of a decedent's
interest to other partners for its estate tax value will not result in any ordinary income
taxation.to the estate." Tenen, Tax Problems at 163.
172. Id at 164.
173. Alfred F. Conrad, Robert L. Knauss, Stanley Siegel, Agency Partnership Cases,
Statutes and Analysis, 414 (4th ed 1987) ("Conrad, Agency Partnership"). These authors
explained the historical understanding of a partnership as follows:
We start with the fact that judges of two hundred years ago did not personify a part-
nership; it would have been as strange to them to speak of property owned by a
partnership as to speak of property owned by a friendship. Later, as merchants came
to personify partnerships, they occasionally conveyed real estate to partnership
names. Judges were startled; sometimes they found that the conveyance conveyed
title to those partners whose names appeared in the firm name; a few thought it
might convey to all actual partners, but hardly any thought it could convey to the
'partnership.'
Conrad, Agency Partnership at 414.
Vol. 31:1
1992 Unrealized Receivables
by the historical treatment of property ownership by partners.
Prior to the adoption of The Uniform Partnership Act 174 ("UPA"),
judges were reluctant to find a partnership capable of owning
property. 175 Under section 8 of the UPA, a partnership is now fully
capable of owning property in its own right, like any other legal
personality.
176
Upon the death of a partner, the question of partnership prop-
erty ownership becomes a little more difficult. In England, courts
permitted control and administration of the partnership personal
property to remain with the surviving partner. 177 The English doc-
trine of equitable conversion permitted a similar treatment of part-
nership realty. 17 8 Under common law in the United States the doc-
trine of equitable conversion treated partnership realty like
partnership personalty, but only to the extent necessary for part-
nership purposes. 179 The question is now resolved by UPA sections
25(2)(d), 25(2)(e) 110 and 26,181 which together adopt a hybrid of
174. Uniform Partnership Act § 8 (1969) ("UPA") provides:
Partnership Property
(1) All property originally brought into the partnership stock or subse-
quently acquired by purchase or otherwise, on account of the partnership, is
partnership property.
(2) Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired with partner-
ship funds is partnership property.
(3) Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership name.
Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the partnership name.
(4) A conveyance to a partnership in the partnership name, though without
words of inheritance, passes the entire estate of the grantor unless a contrary
intent appears.
UPA § 8.
175. See note 174 and accompanying text.
176. Uniform Partnership Act § 8 (1969) (text quoted in note 174).
177. Conrad, Agency Partnership at 415, 416 (cited in note 173). These authors ex-
plained that:
The English courts solved the problem quite painlessly with respect to the partner-
ship personal estate. They promptly recognized that sole control and administration
of the partnership goods should remain with the surviving partner. He was not, how-
ever, like a joint tenant, who as winner took all. The surviving partner had to account
to the decedent's executor, or administrator, who would in turn pay over the proceeds
like the proceeds of other personalty, to the decedent's next of kin.
Id.
178. Id at 416. In England "the pattern of devolution adopted for partnership real
estate was ultimately the same as had been follo wed for partnership chattels. The rights of
use and disposition passed from the decedent to his surviving partners; the proceeds of
liquidation were distributed by the administrator to the next of kin." Id.
179. Id at 416. In the United States "many American courts accordingly decided that
partnership real estate should be treated like partnership personalty only to the extent nec-
essary for partnership purposes." Id.
180. UPA § 25(2)(d) (1969) provides:
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the English and American rules that converts real estate into per-
sonalty for purposes of distribution.
8 2
Although the UPA incorporates both entity and aggregate prin-
ciples in the various contexts of partnership business, 83 the evolu-
tion of partnership property law shows a move from an aggregate
approach to one more consistent with an entity partnership the-
ory."" UPA section 131'1 appears to spring almost exclusively from
NATURE OF A PARTNER'S RIGHT IN SPECIFIC PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
(1) A partner is co-owner with his partners of specific partnership property
holding as a remnant in partnership.
(2) The incidents of this tenancy are such that:
(d) On the death of a partner his right in specific partnership property
vests in the surviving partner or partners, except where the deceased
was the last surviving partner, when his right in such property vests in
his legal representative. Such surviving partner or partners, or the legal
representative of the last surviving partner, has no right to possess the
partnership property for any but a partnership purpose.
(e) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to
dower, curtesy, or allowances to widows, heirs, or next of kin.
UPA § 25(2)(d).
181. UPA § 26 (1969)- provides:
NATURE OF A PARTNER'S INTEREST IN THE PARTNERSHIP
A partner's interest in the Partnership is his share of the profits and surplus, and the
same is personal property.
UPA § 26.
182. Harold Gill Reuschlein, William A Gregory, The Law of Agency and Partnership
64 (West, 2d ed 1990)("Gill, Agency"). These authors noted:
The Uniform Partnership Act does not expressly adopt either the American or the
English rule, yet clearly the drafters intended that section 26 should be used to incor-
porate the English out-and-out conversion theory rather than the American rule of
partial conversion. As a result, nearly all of the courts considering section 26 have
applied the English rule, that real estate which becomes personal property for the
purposes of a partnership remains personal property for the purposes of distribution.
Gill, Agency at 64.
183. Weidner, Perspective at 7 (cited in note 9) . This article concluded that "the
extent to which the final product incorporates the entity as opposed to the aggregate theory
is very much in the eye of the beholder. The Uniform Act was greeted by the suggestion
that it embodied the entity theory much more than its drafters cared to admit. Many still
believe that entity notions permeate the Uniform Act, although there is also respected au-
thority that the aggregate theory predominates." Id.
184. Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate Dispute: Conceptualism and Functional-
ism in Partnership Law, 42 Ark L Rev 395, 400 (1989) ("Rosin, Partnership Law"). The
author noted:
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Uniform Law
Commissioners) has recently undertaken a comprehensive revision of the UPA. Both
the UPA Revision Subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorpo-
rated Associations of the American Bar Association (ABA Subcommittee) and the
Chief Reporter for the Uniform Law Commissioners drafting committee have recom-
mended that the revision "increase" the UPA's emphasis on the entity concept. (cita-
tions omitted)
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the entity theory, while the omission of a definition of the partner-
ship as a "legal person" comes directly from aggregate partnership
theory."" Individual provisions can be justified in terms of either
theory without invalidating the other. Consistency of theory is not
a central requirement of the UPA.
187
The theoretical support for a diversified statute that employs
both entity and aggregate partnership provisions within one statu-
tory scheme can be found in a functional analysis of partner-
ships.188 A functional view of partnerships ignores the fiction of
partnership personhood, or entity, and instead requires an exami-
nation of the underlying rights and obligations of the partner-
ship.8 ' Pursuant to this approach, the intent of the partners be-
comes the primary means of resolving partnership disputes. The
intent of the partners to carry on a single business, separate from
other matters, with commonly owned property, may require either
Rosin, Partnership Law at 400.
185. UPA § 13 (1969) provides:
Partnership Bound by Partner's Wrongful Act
Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course
of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his co-partners, loss or
injury-is caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty
is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so
acting or omitting to act.
UPA § 13.
186. Weidner, Perspective at 9 (cited in note 9). Weidner concluded:
In short, the Uniform Act was still warm from the oven when the debate started over
whether it reflected an aggregate or an entity theory. On the one hand, provisions
such as the one that states that 'the partnership is liable' for wrongful acts of the
partners clearly reflect an entity approach. On the other hand, the Uniform Act
scrapped the initial definition of a partnership as 'a legal person' formed by the asso-
ciation of two or more individuals. (citations omitted)
Id.
187. Id. Weidner noted that "many of its [UPA's] provisions can be rationalized in
terms of either theory." Id.
188. Rosin, Conceptualism at 400 (cited in note 184): Rosin began this article by stat-
ing that:
The thesis of this article is that the revision of the UPA should recognize and rein-
force the UPS's existing functional approach. Only a functional approach allows di-
rect evaluation of whether, for any given purpose, the partners should be treated col-
lectively (like an entity) or separately (as an Aggregate). Under the functional
approach, that determination is not made legalistically on the basis of the metaphysi-
cal person-hood of a partnership. Instead, it is made realistically in light of: (1) the
relevant rights and obligations of partners under partnership law generally, and (2)
the policy considerations relevant to a particular purpose.
Id.
189. Id at 415-16. Rosin found that "simply put, the UPA formally recognizes that the
nature of the partnership relationship requires that the rights and obligations arising there-
under be treated differently than rights and obligations that do not. (citations omitted)" Id.
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entity or aggregate treatment of specific partnership items depend-
ing upon the context of that intent.1 90
One illustration of the functional approach may be seen in the
interplay between UPA section 26191 and UPA section 9(3).191 Pur-
suant to those sections, a partner's interest in the partnership is
personal property and may be conveyed, but partnership property
itself may not be conveyed by the individual partner acting in his
own interest.19 The intent of the parties with respect to ownership
of property used in the business is fundamentally different from
their intent concerning ownership of an interest in the partnership.
Functionally, partnership property is intended to be an asset of
the partnership entity. The intent of the partners is to treat the
asset as owned by the collective partnership rather than the indi-
vidual partner. The partner's interest in the partnership, however,
is not intended to be an asset of the entity. It is a separate right,
unique to each partner, that includes the immediate right to prof-
its and surplus. Accordingly, the entity theory works best to ex-
plain the prohibition on assignment of partnership property under
UPA section 9,194 and aggregate theory works best to explain the
treatment of a partner's interest in the partnership under UPA
section 26. 15 Although there has been considerable debate about
190. Id. Rosin further explained:
This separate treatment of partnership-related rights and obligations is not based on
the fiction that a partnership is a metaphysical unity, a separate entity or a legal
person. Instead, the need for separate treatment derives from the underlying realities
of the partnership itself. First, as a matter of fact, the partners are conducting a
single business. Second, as a matter of fact, partners tend to segregate business re-
lated matters from purely personal matters. Third, when partners acquire common
property for business purposes, they do so with the intent of dedicating that property
to the business. (citations omitted)
Id.
191. UPA § 26 (1969) (text quoted in note 181).
192. UPA § 9(3) (1969) provides:
(3) Unless authorized by the other partners or unless they have abandoned the busi-
ness, one or more but not less than all the partners have no authority to:
(a) Assign the partnership property in trust for creditors or on the assignee's
promise to pay the debts of the partnership,
(b) Dispose of the good-will of the business,
(c) Do any other act which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary
business of the partnership,
(d) Confess a judgment,
(e) Submit a partnership claim or liability to arbitration or reference.
UPA § 9(3).
193. Rosin, Conceptualism at 417-19 (cited in note 184).
194. UPA § 9 (1969).
195. UPA § 26 (1969) (text quoted in note 181).
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the interface between the two partnership theories, current part-
nership scholars suggest that the UPA should move away from ag-
gregate theory and toward even greater reliance upon an entity
model." 6 Curiously, the only limit upon that model is the effect of
the Internal Revenue Code on partnership issues.
197
The Internal Revenue Code was not created in a vacuum. It is
responsive to the same economic forces and must address the same
issues as those addressed in the UPA. The distinguishing factor, of
course, is that the Code must add a level of analysis that justifies
the imposition of tax upon partners based upon partnership in-
come. The next part of this article will therefore address the re-
sults of an application of tax policy to the partnership theories de-
veloped in connection with the UPA.
B. Partnership Tax Theory
1. Tax Policy and the Primacy of Income Classification
It may by now be a cliche to note that "the tax tail wags the
state organization dog", 19 8 but it is nevertheless true that tax con-
siderations may be the ultimate constraint on partnership activ-
ity.9 9 The pass-through nature of partnerships has been extremely
196.. Weidner, Perspective at 9-10 (cited in note 9). The author observed:
Given that the entity theory seems to inhere in the Uniform Act more than its final
authors cared to admit, given that the entity theory seems to cut in favor of rather
than against simplicity, and given that partnerships of significant size and complexity
have become common, including partnerships with corporations and limited partner-
ships as partners, there is widespread opinion that a revised Uniform Act should
more directly adopt an entity model. (citations omitted)
Id.
197. UPA Revision Subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorpo-
rated Business Organizations, Should the Uniform Partnership Act be Revised?, 43 Bus
Law 121, 124 (1987). See also Weidner, Perspective at 10 (cited in note 9).
198. Weidner, Perspective at 36-7. Weidner noted:
Some of the suggested changes to the Uniform Act appear to bear at least indirectly
on the tax classification of partnerships. Continuity of life and free transferability of
interests appear to be enhanced by provisions such as those requiring registration of
partnerships and those redefining dissolution and its consequences. Centralized man-
agement might be strengthened by provisions authorizing voting and limiting the
agency of certain partners. None of the changes more broadly discussed, however,
would restrict the unlimited personal liability of partners. That personal liability has
great significance for federal income tax purposes. Indeed, given that the unlimited
personal liability of profit sharers is a policy upon which states seem to place little or
no value, as indicated by their recent liberalization of limited partnership statutes,
one wonders whether the tacit concession of the personal liability of partners is in
recognition of the fact that the federal tax tail really wags the state organization dog.
Id.
199. Id at 33: "[T]ax law may be the ultimate constraint on the partnership project."
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attractive to investors interested in tax advantaged investments.
The transfer of income or loss to individual partners is not an in-
herent partnership right. It exists only by legislative grace. Accord-
ingly, investors who wish to benefit from that feature of the organi-
zation known to the Internal Revenue Code as a partnership must
obey the Code in forming their organization.
The Code employs a pragmatic method for taxing partnership
activity.200 Entity and aggregate treatment of partnership issues
are both present in the Code. Taxpayers may, in certain limited
circumstances, choose between those theories.201 Rather than adopt
one theory to the exclusion of the other, the Code employs both.02
In this way the Code can be viewed under the same functional type
of analysis that can be used to explain partnership law applications
of entity and aggregate theory.
Although primarily pragmatic, subchapter K contains illustra-
tions of both entity and aggregate partnership theories. Neither
theory was adopted to the exclusion of the other. Individual
problems presented by specific partnership items or transactions
are addressed individually. Entity and aggregate partnership the-
ory present alternative methods for resolving partnership issues,
but normative tax policy determines which of those solutions sup-
Id.
200. Id at 32. "The federal income tax law governing the taxation of partners and
partnerships should be considered for two basic reasons. First, the tax law suggests that
pragmatism rather than partisanship be brought to the entity/aggregate controversy." Id.
201. Id at 32-33. ,
Just as there are separate statutes under state law governing corporations and part-
nerships, there are separate subchapters of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code)
governing corporations and partnerships. The tax law of Subchapter K, governing
partners and partnerships, is helpful because it indicates a pragmatic approach to the
entity/aggregate dichotomy. It suggests that there is no need to adopt one theory as
the exclusive theory. It suggests, instead, that some questions are best handled with
an entity approach whereas others are best, or at least satisfactorily, handled through
an aggregate approach. It also suggests that in other cases, the partners themselves
may elect either an entity or an aggregate approach.
Id.
202. See US v Basye, 410 US 441, 448, n 8 (1973), which indicated that:
There has been a great deal of discussion in the briefs and in the lower court opinions
with respect to whether a partnership is to be viewed as an 'entity' or as a 'conduit.'
We find ourselves in agreement with the Solicitor General's remark during oral argu-
ment when he suggested that 'lilt seems odd that we should still be discussing such
things in 1972.'[citation omitted]. The legislative history indicates, and the commen-
tators agree, that partnerships are entities for purposes of calculating and filing infor-
mational returns but that they are conduits through which the taxpaying obligation
passes to the individual partners in accord with their distributive shares.
Basye, 410 US at 448, n 8.
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ports the imposition of tax. An illustration of this approach can be
seen in the Code's treatment of a partnership as a non-taxpayer,203
while at the same time allowing the partnership its own tax year
20 4
in which income is computed 05 and audits are conducted at the
partnership level. 206 Occasionally the drafters found it necessary to
apply both theories to different issues present in a single tax event.
Section 743,207 which addresses the transfer of a partnership inter-
est by sale or upon the death of a partner, is sometimes cited as an
example of a provision that gives the taxpayer a choice between
aggregate and entity theories.2 08  The general rule of section
203. IRC § 701 (1986) (text quoted in note 8).
204. IRC § 706(b)(1)(A) (1986) provides:
(b) TAXABLE YEAR. -
(1)PARTNERSHIP'S TAXABLE YEAR. -
(A) PARTNERSHIP TREATED AS TAXPAYER. - The taxable year
of a partnership shall be determined as though the partnership were a
taxpayer.
IRC § 706(b)(1)(A).
205. IRC § 703(b) (1986) provides:
(b) ELECTIONS OF THE PARTNERSHIP. - Any election affecting the computa-
tion of taxable income derived from a partnership shall be made by the partnership,
IRC § 703(b).
206. IRC §§ 6221 (1986); 6222 (1986); 6223-6231 (1986).
207. IRC § 743 (1986) provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE. - The basis of partnership property shall not be adjusted as
the result of a transfer of an interest in a partnership by sale or exchange or on the
death of a partner unless the election provided by section 754 (relating to optional
adjustment to basis of partnership property) is in effect with respect to such
partnership.
(b) ADJUSTMENT TO BASIS OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY. - In the case of a
transfer of an interest in a partnership by sale or exchange or upon the death of a
partner, a partnership with respect to which the election provided in section 754 is in
effect shall -
(1) increase the adjusted basis of the partnership property by the excess of the
basis to the transferee partner of his interest in the partnership over his pro-
portionate share of the adjusted basis of the partnership property, or
(2) decrease the adjusted basis of the partnership property by the excess of the
transferee partner's proportionate share of the adjusted basis of the partner-
ship property over the basis of his interest in the partnership.
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, such increase or decrease shall consti-
tute an adjustment to the basis of partnership property with respect to the transferee
partner only . ...
IRC § 743.
208. Weidner, Perspective at 34 (cited in note 9). Weidner illustrates this choice with
the following example:
Other provisions give partners the choice of an aggregate or an entity model. For
example, the general rule is that, when a partner purchases his partnership interest,
he will not be given a special basis in each of the partnership's assets to reflect the
price he paid for his partnership interest. [IRC § 743(a)] On the other hand, if the
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743(a)2 °9 recognizes the UPA distinction between an interest in a
partnership and an interest in partnership property. Transfer of an
interest in a partnership will not trigger a change in basis of the
partnership property unless the provisions of section 74310 are
met. The Code provides for an election on the part of an acquiring
partner to either ignore the individual assets of the partnership
and treat it like an entity, or to adjust the basis in individual as-
sets of the partnership under an aggregate partnership theory.
Thus, whereas the UPA 211 treats a partnership interest as a prop-
erty right under an entity approach and forbids a fragmentation of
the partnership interest by denying a property interest in partner-
ship property, the Code recognizes a property interest in individual
partnership assets to the extent of assigning individual basis to
those assets in the hands of an acquiring partner." 2
The Tax Court has said that the question of income in respect of
a decedent goes to the very foundation of partnership taxation the-
ory.213 The analysis requires a resolution of the tension inherent in
treating a partnership interest as a bundle of property rights, of
which unrealized receivables is but one such right, and treating
such an interest as an entity separate and apart from the individ-
partnership files an election, those who purchase partnership interests may ignore the
entity approach and claim they purchased a direct interest in the underlying assets of
the partnership. As a result, each partner will be given a special basis in the underly-
ing partnership assets to reflect the price she paid for her partnership interest.[IRC §
743(b)].
Id.
209. IRC § 743(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 207).
210. IRC § 743(a).
211. See UPA §§ 9(3) (text quoted in note 192) and 26 (1969) (text quoted in 181).
212. Section 743 allows a purchaser of a partnership to avoid tax on gain that she has
already paid for. On the sale of a partnership asset gain would be reported as income to
each partner equal to the difference between the sale price of the asset and the basis of that
asset. If the new partner had paid a price for her partnership interest that reflected the fair
market value of the asset she would be unfairly taxed on the increase in its value. Ignoring
the corresponding increase in basis due to the sale which would ultimately correct the prob-
lem, section 743(b) allows the new partner to avoid taxation by adjusting her basis in the
sold partnership property for purposes of determining her share of the gain. See Babette
Barton, et al, Cases and Materials Taxation of Business Enterprise 1992-1993, 19,115
(CCH, 1991) ("Barton, Cases").
213. Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ct at 1344, exemplifies this belief when it observed:
Many of the assertions of the parties have dealt with the superstructure of the part-
nership provisions - assertions based upon a technical and involuted analysis of those
provisions dealing with the various adjustments and the treatment to be accorded to
distributions after the basis of the partnership has been determined. But, as we have
previously indicated, the question herein involves the foundation, not the superstruc-
ture, i.e., what is the basis of petitioner's partnership interest. [citations omitted]
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ual assets of the partnership. Treating the partnership as a bundle
of property rights under an aggregate theory would support the
Tax Court's application of income in respect of a decedent to un-
realized receivables. Treating the partnership as an entity would
undermine the Tax Court's position and support a technical read-
ing of the Code to limit income in respect of a decedent to cases in
which the entity liquidates the interest of a deceased partner
under section 736(a).2 1
The central issue in Quick Trust1 5 was the basis adjustments
sought by a successor in interest under section 743.216 While other
Code sections may be explained by either entity or aggregate prin-
ciples, section 743217 seems to require application of both theories.
Accordingly, the entity and aggregate theories of partnership taxa-
tion, as focused through the lens of section 743,215 are concentrated
on the successor of the interest of a deceased partner. Entity the-
ory of partnership taxation forms the foundation for section 74319
in that the transfer of an interest in a partnership entity causes a
mismatch between the acquiring partner's basis in her interest and
the basis the partnership has in its assets which are represented in
the acquiring partner's partnership interest. Reconciliation of
those bases is consistent with aggregate theory. In the context of
the death of a partner, aggregate theory would require an examina-
tion of each partnership asset to determine whether it was within
the general rule of section 1014220 or its exception, section
1014(c),221 and thereby outside the basis adjustment provided by
section 743.222
The Tax Court has noted that there is no statutory provision
dealing with the specific problem of the basis in the partnership
interest of a transferee of a deceased partner.223 Accordingly, it has
214. IRC § 736(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 45).
215. Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ct at 1340-41.
216. IRC § 743 (1954).
217. IRC § 743 (1986) (text quoted in note 207).
218. IRC § 743.
219. Id.
220. IRC § 1014 (1986).
221. IRC § 1014
222. IRC § 743 (1986).
223. See for example, Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ct at 1345, where the court noted:
Petitioner would have us equate the absence of statutory language specifically dealing
with the problem herein and purported inferences from tangential provisions with an
intention on the part of Congress entirely to relieve from taxation an item that had
previously been held subject to tax.
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addressed itself to the fundamental question of the nature of basis
in a partnership interest.22" This inquiry addresses the bedrock
principles that support the Code's treatment of partnership basis.
The court employed a pragmatic approach that questioned the
entity and aggregate theories for the purpose of determining which
theory is better in explaining a result that furthers normative tax
policy. The court's analysis was based upon both its reading of the
Code and its analysis of legislative history concerning entity and
aggregate principles,22 5 in the larger context of sound tax policy.
Accordingly, the court tested each approach against the yardstick
of recognition of income and the corollary of basis adjustment, a
standard that controls not just partnership issues but is superim-
posed over the entire Code. Fidelity to that standard supersedes
any question of consistency with entity or aggregate partnership
theory, because the principle of income recognition is a normative
principle found throughout the Code. Hence, the more basic con-
sideration of the nature of income underlies the analysis of part-
nership tax theory, notwithstanding any secondary analysis under
non-tax partnership entity and aggregate theory. This return to
basic income tax principles is pragmatic because it requires an
analysis of the substance of the income item in question. It is simi-
lar to the functional analysis of partnership law in that both are
concerned with entity and aggregate theories as explanations of
functional or pragmatic results that are required by superior prin-
ciples of partnership intent or tax policy respectively. The first in-
quiry is not which theory to apply; rather it is which theory best
explains the result required by a superior principle, namely the
preservation of income. After resolution of that first order princi-
ple, entity or aggregate theory can be used to resolve ancillary is-
sues such as basis.
2. Implementation Of Tax Policy
The drafters of the 1954 Code recognized that "[t]he existing tax
224. Id at 1344. The court declared that "the question herein involves the foundation,
not the superstructure, i.e., what is the basis of petitioner's partnership interest?" Id.
225. Id at 1343. The following passage addresses this analysis:
Thus, to the extent that a "plain meaning" can be distilled from the partnership
provisions of the 1954 Code, we think that it is contrary to petitioner's position. In
point of fact, however, we hesitate to rest our decision in an area such as is involved
herein exclusively on such linguistic clarity and purity. [citation omitted]. However,
an examination of the legislative purpose reinforces our reading of the statute.
Vol. 31:1
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treatment of partners and partnerships is among the most con-
fused in the entire income tax field.""2 " Accordingly, they took the
opportunity to articulate the theoretical, as well as practical, rea-
sons supporting the provisions they drafted.
The troublesome area of transactions between partners and
partnerships became a clearly identified battleground between en-
tity and aggregate theory.22 7  The House Report specifically
adopted an entity foundation upon which it built partnership Code
sections to implement that approach.2 28 Although the drafters
failed to expressly adopt either theory in the context of unrealized
receivables as income in respect of a decedent, the legislative his-
tory, taken in total, appears to employ aggregate principles in ad-
dressing this issue.229 Nowhere is this more evident than in the
portion of the House Report that explains the anti-abuse provi-
sions of the proposed new partnership sections. Here the drafters
explain that there ought to be no exception from ordinary income
for unrealized receivables based solely upon inclusion of such items
in a partnership.3 0 Consistent with the first order principle that
226. Ways and Means Committee Report on Internal Revenue Code of 1954, HR No
1337, 83d Cong, 2d Sess (1954), in 3 USCANN 4017, 4091 (1954) ("House Report").
227. House Report at 4093:
When a partner sells property to, or performs services for the partnership, the prob-
lem arises whether the transaction is to be treated in the same manner as though the
partner were an outsider dealing with the partnership (the "entity" approach). An
alternative ("aggregate" approach) is to view the partner as dealing with himself to
the extent of his own interest and as dealing with the partnership with respect to the
balance of the transaction.
Id.
228. Id at 4093: "Because of its simplicity of operation, the 'entity' rule has been
adopted." Id.
229. Id at 4097. The House Report addresses income in respect of a decedent under
the general heading of unrealized receivables within the context of section 751. That section
treats some assets of a partnership as outside the entity for purposes of determining gain on
the disposition of a partnership interest. It treats the partnership as an aggregation of spe-
cific property rights for purposes of preventing the conversion of items of ordinary income,
locked in the partnership entity, from being transformed into capital gain on the disposition
of the partnership interest by a partner. That rationale is applied to unrealized receivables.
in the partnership on the death of a partner. Hence, the legislative history, taken as a whole,
seems to adopt an aggregate approach to IRD in the partnership context.
230. Id at 4097-4098:
The provisions relating to unrealized receivables or fees and appreciated or depreci-
ated inventory are necessary to prevent the use of the partnership as a device for
obtaining capital-gain treatment on fees or other rights to income. Amounts attribu-
table to such rights would be treated as ordinary income if realized in normal course
by the partnership. The sale of a partnership interest or distributions to partners
should not be permitted to change the character of this income. The statutory treat-
ment proposed, in general, regards the income rights as severable from the partner-
ship interest and as subject to the same tax consequences which would be accorded
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unrealized receivables must generate ordinary income, they must
continue to do so even when they are transferred in the form of a
component of a partnership interest. The entity is "pierced" and
the transfer of an interest in the entity is broken into its constitu-
ent parts for determining the taxability of the proceeds from the
transfer.281
Aggregate partnership theory also supports the House Report's
statement that a deceased partner's share of unrealized receivables
will be treated as IRD.12" The partnership entity is fractured in
order to serve a higher principle, in this case preserving the funda-
mental principle of income recognition. The superior mandate that
no item of income go untaxed remains intact in the partnership
arena only if individual items of income remain so, regardless of
their presence in the partnership entity.
The invention of section 751 and its treatment of unrealized re-
ceivables as unique partnership assets is perhaps the best example
of subjugating partnership theory to the higher principles of in-
come recognition.2 33 Pursuant to section 751,234 the entity theory
that' is normally applied to an interest in a partnership is ignored
an individual entrepreneur.
Id.
231. See IRC §751(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 235).
232. House Report at 4097 (cited in note 226):
A decedent partner's share of unrealized receivables and fees will be treated as in-
come in respect of a decedent. Such rights to income will be taxed to the estate or
heirs when collected, with an appropriate adjustment for estate taxes.
Id.
233. Id at 4096-4097:
Under present decisions the sale of a partnership interest is generally considered to
be a sale of a capital asset, and any gain or loss realized is treated as a capital gain or
loss. It is not clear whether the sale of an interest whose value is attributable to
uncollected rights to income gives rise to capital gain or ordinary income. There is
also doubt under present law whether the basis of the assets of the partnership may
be adjusted, or is required to be adjusted, to reflect the purchase price paid by a new
partner for his interest.
In order to prevent the conversion of potential ordinary income into capital gain by
virtue of transfers of partnership interests, certain rules have been adopted by your
committee which will apply to all dispositions of partnership interests. The bill pro-
vides that, if in connection with the transfer of a partnership interest, the partner
receives any amount attributable to his share of (1) the unrealized receivables and
fees of the partnerships or (2) substantially appreciated or depreciated inventory or
stock in trade, such amounts are to be treated as ordinary gain or loss. In effect, the
partner is treated as though he disposed of such items independently of the rest of
his partnership interest.
234. IRC § 751 (1986).
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for all cases in which the partnership interest includes unrealized
receivables or inventory items.2 5 These components of the part-
nership interest, which would otherwise generate ordinary income
if earned outside the partnership context, are segregated from the
partnership interest and treated as items of ordinary income upon
sale or exchange of an interest, notwithstanding that the sale is
treated as a sale of a capital asset for all other purposes. 3 6 In other
words, the transfer of a property interest in the partnership carries
with it the transfer in the individual partnership assets. The assets
that generate ordinary income on sale continue to do so for pur-
poses of determining the gain on the transaction to the selling
partner.
As we have seen, the strictly statutory approach of sections
753,237 736(a),23 8 and 691239 requires the segregation of unrealized
receivables from the rest of the partnership interest when there is
a payment in liquidation of an interest of a deceased partner. The
Tax Court has found support in legislative history for the same
treatment in the contexts of continuation of the partnership inter-
est or sale of that interest.2 40 The House Report supports that po-
sition and states that "[a] decedent partner's share of unrealized
receivables and fees will be treated as income in respect of a dece-
dent. '2 4' 1 Although the report does not articulate a theoretical basis
for that position, it is consistent with the aggregate approach used
with respect to unrealized receivables under section 751(a).24 2
Moreover, it confirms the theory that normative tax principles su-
persede entity or aggregate theory and, specifically, that the nor-
mative principle of income recognition supersedes entity theory in
235. IRC § 751(a) (1986) provides:
(a) SALE OR EXCHANGE OF INTEREST IN PARTNERSHIP. - The amount of
any money, or the fair market value of any property, received by a transferor partner
in exchange for all or a part of his interest in the partnership attributable to -
(1) unrealized receivables of the partnership, or
(2) inventory items of the partnership which have appreciated substantially in
value, shall be considered as an amount realized from the sale or exchange of
property other than a capital asset.
IRC § 751(a).
236. Id.
237. IRC § 753 (1986) (text quoted in note 44).
238. IRC § 736(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 45).
239. IRC § 691 (1986).
240. George Edward Quick Trust v Commissioner, 54 Tax Ct 1336, aff'd 444 F2d 90
(8th Cir 1972); Chrissie H. Woodhall v Commissioner, 28 Tax Ct Mem Ced 1438, affd 454
F2d 226 (9th Cir 1972).
241. House Report at 4097 (cited in note 226).
242. IRC § 751(a) (1986) (text quoted in. note 235).
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matters concerning IRD.2 3
Entity theory cannot justify a fragmentation of the partnership
interest. Aggregate partnership theory, on the other hand, requires
it. Unrealized receivables are therefore the exception to the entity
approach to partnerships initially expressed by the drafters of the
Code. Maintaining the higher principle of income recognition re-
quires an exception to entity theory for partnerships when income
items such as unrealized receivables are included in the partner-
ship entity. At such times the entity must be ignored, and the in-
come items split out for purposes of recognizing income on the sale
or exchange of those items. Furthermore, consistent with the treat-
ment of unrealized receivables under section 751,244 there must
also be an exception to the partnership entity for IRD, not only in
the event of termination of the partnership interest, but also in the
case of a transfer of that interest to a successor or the sale of that
interest to a third party.
C. Reconciliation Of Tax And Non-Tax Partnership Theories
Commentators have recognized that it is possible, even desirable,
to use both entity and aggregate theories in crafting the UPA and
the Code.24 5 That does not mean, however, that both theories
should be used in the resolution of a single partnership issue. If we
focus on the issue of determining the basis of a partnership inter-
est and the underlying partnership assets upon the death of a part-
ner, we can apply normative tax principles and then analyze the
result in terms of entity and aggregate partnership theory.
Entity theory applied generally, in other words, not limited to
the case of a deceased partner, appears to work best when the
partnership interest contains no unrealized receivables or appreci-
ated inventory. Section 751(a)24 6 would not come into play, and an
interest in the partnership entity would be treated like an interest
in any other sort of entity, for example, a corporation. In other
words, it would be a capital asset. No further inquiry would be
made into its constituent parts and the basis of the interest in the
hands of a successor would be its fair market value as obtained
243. Weidner, Primer at 33 (cited in note 7). The author observed: "The terribly com-
plex rules of section 751 are basically designed to require the recognition of ordinary income
on the sale of an interest in a partnership that holds 751 assets and on certain distributions
from such a partnership." (citations omitted). Id.
244. IRC § 751 (1986) (text quoted in note 234).
245. Weidner, Perspective at 32-33 (cited in note 9).
246. IRC § 751(a) (1986).
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either through sale or through the application of section 1014.1,1
Once the partnership interest is examined for purposes of de-
tecting the presence of hot assets, however, the aggregate theory
has been triggered. There can be no turning back, no return to en-
tity principles. The entity, having once been partitioned, cannot be
reconstituted. Only by fragmenting the partnership interest into
its constituent parts can an asset-by-asset analysis be performed.
That fragmentation is itself an application of aggregate partner-
ship theory. Accordingly, partnership interests are not thereafter
regarded as interests in an entity. The most that can be said is
that after an examination of the aggregate components of the part-
nership interest, no reason can be found to fragment the group
into individual and differing subgroups.
Some commentators have concluded that the possibility of the
absence of hot assets, and the corresponding treatment of the part-
nership interest as an entity, means that there is really a "modified
entity approach" at work.248 It seems, however, that the initial ex-
amination of a partnership interest extinguishes the entity theory.
The Code requires an examination of each asset for the purposes
of classifying it under section 751.249 It then prescribes specific,
and differing, treatment for those assets based upon the initial
classification. The fact that after such a procedure the interest may
be treated as containing some or none of the hot assets described
in section 751250 does not change the theory which requires the ini-
tial examination. The mere resemblance of the final product to an
entity does not alter the process which generated that product. It
is the process, the approach, the analysis, that we are attempting
to define, not the product.
The foundation of the aggregate approach to partnership theory
is the splitting of the partnership into discrete bundles of rights
and obligations. The partnership interest is composed of many
such rights and responsibilities." 1 By examining those rights indi-
vidually pursuant to the superior normative principle of income
recognition, we employ an aggregate theoretical framework that ig-
nores the partnership entity. Even if there were no unrealized re-
ceivables present in the partnership interest and it were therefore
disposed of, or valued, as if it were a share of an entity, the exami-
247. IRC § 1014 (1986).
248. Lind, Fundamentals at 213 (cited in note 34).
249. IRC § 751 (1986).
250. IRC § 751.
251. UPA §§ 13, 14, 15, 18, 24, 25, 26 (1969).
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nation of the interest for the purpose of deciding whether it con-
tains partnership property defined as unrealized receivables is ag-
gregate in nature.
There is no real mix of aggregate and entity theory to the dispo-
sition of the partnership interest, either upon the death of the
partner or upon an inter vivos disposition of the interest: there is
only aggregate theory. The fact that after the application of the
aggregate inquiry it is determined that there is no reason to frag-
ment the interest into its constituent parts, and the interest is
treated as a single unit, does not change the nature of the original
inquiry. The initial aggregate inquiry having been accomplished
and the higher-order principle of income recognition having been
served, the partnership interest can now be transferred or valued
with the benefit of a comprehensive analysis of each of its constitu-
ent parts.
V. HOT ASSETS: THE SCOPE OF UNREALIZED RECEIVABLES
A. The Nature Of Hot Assets
Armed with an aggregate partnership theory, that is, treatment
of the partnership interest as an aggregation of rights and respon-
sibilities, we now require a refinement of the definition of those
constituent parts. In other words, we need a definition of unreal-
ized receivables.
The Code defines unrealized receivables in section 751(c)2"2 to
include a wide array of items in addition to earned but not yet
received income. Included in the definition are assets that generate
ordinary income to the partnership. Assets such as mining prop-
erty, farm land, and franchises are illustrative of the type of asset
which, as partnership property, will trigger the recognition of ordi-
nary income on the disposition of a partnership interest under sec-
tion 751(a).253 It is the presence in the partnership of these so-
called "hot assets" that requires the aggregate approach to resolv-
ing questions concerning the proper tax treatment of income from
the disposition of a partnership interest. Each of the assets in the
partnership is examined and classified prior to resolution of the
ultimate question of recognition of income.
The scope of section 751(c), 214 unrealized receivables, far exceeds
those items that would be so classified for purposes of income in
252. IRC § 751(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 37).
253. IRC § 751(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 235).
254. IRC § 751(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 37).
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respect of a decedent in the non-partnership context. If this were
the end of the analysis of the partnership interest under section
751(c), 2" then all of the items contained therein could be consid-
ered IRD in the partnership context.2" However, having once es-
tablished an aggregate theoretical analysis of IRD at the partner-
ship level, it is theoretically sound to continue that analysis
throughout the components of the partnership interest. In other
words, section 751(c) " 7 should not only be viewed as creating a
sub-entity within the partnership but should also be viewed as a
bundle of items that should be considered individually.
B. Proper Treatment Of Hot Assets As Income In Respect Of A
Decendent ("IRD")
If aggregate partnership theory explains IRD as applied to part-
nerships upon the death of a partner, it follows that each compo-
nent of the partnership interest should be examined to determine
its individual proper treatment. The partnership, when viewed as
an aggregation of individual discrete items, is open to individual,
item-by-item scrutiny.2" The proper question to ask in resolving
such treatment concerns the nature of the income item under nor-
mative principles of income in respect of a decedent generally, in
other words, outside the partnership context, because it is the ap-
plication of those principles to unrealized receivables that initially
required the segregation of unrealized receivables from other part-
nership assets under sections 691(e), 2 1 753,260 and 736.261
The touchstone of our analysis has consistently been the norma-
tive principle of income recognition. All of the items listed in sec-
255. Id.
256. McKee, Partnerships at 23-25 (cited in note 138). The author concluded:
The rationale of Quick Trust and Woodhall strongly suggest that partnership items
other than zero-basis accounts receivable may be IRD. Under this analysis, IRD in-
cludes any partnership item that would be IRD if held by the decedent in his individ-
ual capacity. On the other hand, partnership items (such as potential depreciation
recapture) that would not be IRD, if held individually, should not be IRD simply
because they fall within the §751(c) definition of 'unrealized receivables'. (citations
omitted).
Id.
257. IRC § 751(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 37).
258. An entity theory would not permit an item by item analysis. As discussed above,
that theory is premised upon the integrity of the entity to the exclusion of investigation of
the constituent parts of the organization.
259. IRC § 691(e) (1986) (text quoted in note 43).
260. IRC § 753 (1986) (text quoted in note 44).
261. IRC § 736 (1986).
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tion 751(c)262 would require ordinary income recognition by the
partner disposing of her interest in a partnership which contained
such items. Pursuant to section 751(a), 63 sale of a partnership in-
terest containing items described in section 751(c),264 so called hot
assets, would generate ordinary income. That does not mean, how-
ever, that all of those items are properly treated as IRD.
There is a further refinement in our bedrock principle of recog-
nition of income that must be addressed upon the death of a tax-
payer. As explained above, IRD provides a mechanism for taxing
income earned by a decedent before her death, but paid after her
death.26 5 It does not apply to all items of income, just to those
earned but not yet received by the taxpayer. As mentioned above,
the first characteristic of IRD is that section 69166 properly ap-
plies to items that would have been realized by the decedent in
gross income without further effort. The ordinary unrealized re-
ceivables fall into this category. Their payment will occur in time
and will not be due to any further effort on the part of the dece-
dent. The unrealized receivables that are defined in section
751(c) 26 as other than those ordinary unrealized receivables are
different in that they all require further action before thay would
have been realized by the decedent. That further action would ei-
ther be disposition of the partnership interest, thereby triggering
section 751(a), 6" or disposition of the property itself by the
partnership.
The legislative history provides some specific guidance and sup-
port for that analysis in the partnership area. The House Report
explains the nature of unrealized receivables contained in the part-
nership interest.269 It also describes a distinction between section
751(a) 7 ° unrealized receivables, and IRD unrealized receivables.
262. IRC §751(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 37).
263. IRC § 751(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 235).
264. IRC § 751(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 37).
265. Helvering v Enright, 312 US 636 (1941).
266. IRC § 691 (1986) (text quoted in note 23).
267. IRC § 751(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 37).
268. IRC § 751(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 235).
269. House Report at 4097 (cited in note 226):
A decedent partner's share of unrealized receivables and fees will be treated as in-
come in respect of a decedent. Such rights to income will be taxed to the estate or
heirs when collected, with an appropriate adjustment for estate taxes. However, a
decedent's share of appreciated or depreciated inventory or stock in trade is not
treated as income in respect of a decedent.
Id.
270. IRC § 751(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 235).
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Section 751(a)2 7' addresses itself to either unrealized receivables or
appreciated inventory. The House Report clearly excludes appreci-
ated inventory from income in respect of a decedent27 2 Further-
more, the House Report defines unrealized receivables or fees
much differently from than the section 751(c)273 definition. 74 Ac-
cordingly, the House Report supports the view that IRD includes
only unrealized receivables in the general sense of unpaid but pre-
viously earned income. In this connection, the distinction is be-
tween amounts that would have been realized by the deceased tax-
payer if she had been on an accrual basis prior to her death and
amounts unrecognized by reason of a cash method of accounting.
The fact that she was on a cash basis is what led to those amounts
not being realized prior to her death and what requires their inclu-
sion in IRD.
In our example, the A and A partnership uses the cash method
of accounting for income. Amounts which were earned by the firm
would have been taken into income by the deceased under an ac-
crual method. The use of a cash method should not isolate
amounts earned but not yet paid from income taxation. And as we
have seen IRD is the statutory device that ensures the income tax-
ation of the amounts received by the cash method taxpayer that
were earned prior to death but received after death.
If, as I have argued, aggregate partnership theory underlies in-
come in respect of a decedent in the partnership context, it follows
that aggregate theory should be applied throughout the analysis.
Each component of the partnership interest, including unrealized
271. IRC § 751(a).
272. House Report at 4097 (cited in note 226):
[A] decedent's share of appreciated or depreciated inventory or stock in trade is not
treated as income in respect of a decedent. The decedent's interest in such inventory
or stock in trade will be increased or decreased in basis in the same manner as other
property held by the decedent. The change in basis as the time of death will not be
reflected in the basis of partnership assets but will be used by the estate or heir as an
adjustment to the income received on the disposition of such property. The estate or
heir is thus treated in the same manner as a purchaser with respect to the decedent's
interest in appreciated or depreciated inventory or stock in trade.
Id.
273. IRC § 751(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 37).
274. House Report at 4097 (cited in note 226):
The term "unrealized receivables or fees" is used to apply to any rights to income
which have not been included in gross income under the method of accounting em-
ployed by the partnership. The provision is applicable mainly to cash basis partner-




receivables, should be examined to determine whether it is IRD.
The first characteristic of IRD is that earned but not realized
items of income may not be avoided by virtue of their inclusion in
a partnership. We should now examine individual section 751(c) 7 5
unrealized receivables to determine which ones constitute earned
but not received items of income.
The regulations seem to ignore any distinctions among section
751(c)2"6 hot assets in the IRD context. Regulation section 1.736-
1(b)(2) 27 provides that, for purposes of section 736(a),2 78 the term
unrealized receivables is defined by section 751(c) 79 As described
above, that definition encompasses a panoply of unrelated items
including stock of a DISC2 80 or former DISC, section -1245281 and
125082 recapture, stock in foreign corporations, trademarks, etc.
The possibility that those and other section 751(c)2 83 items might
be afforded the same treatment as the simple unrealized receiv-
ables in Woodhall and Quick Trust has caused commentators to
express concern.28 4 The application of aggregate partnership theory
in the presence of IRD principles, however, should put that con-
cern to rest.
Only section 751(c) items that represent earned but not yet real-
ized income may be IRD. Employing the item-by-item analysis re-
quired by aggregate partnership theory, none of the items listed in
the flush language of section 751(c) 8 5 qualifies for IRD treatment,
because none is earned but not yet realized. They are all potential
future ordinary income items, not items of income that have been
earned but not realized at death.
275. IRC § 751(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 37).
276. IRC § 751(c).
277. Treas Reg § 1.736-1(b)(2) (1965) explains:
Payments made to a retiring partner or to the successor in interest of a deceased
partner for the interest in unrealized receivables of the partnership in excess of their
partnership basis, including any special basis adjustment for them to which such
partner is entitled, shall not be considered as made in exchange for such partner's
interest in the partnership property. Such payments shall be treated as payments
under section 736(a) and paragraph (a) of this section. For definition of unrealized
receivables, see section 751(c).
Treas Reg § 1.736-1(b)(2).
278. IRC § 736(a) (1986) (text quoted in note 45).
279. IRC § 751 (1986) (text quoted in note 234).
280. IRC § 992(a) (1986).
281. IRC § 1245 (1986).
282. IRC § 1250 (1986).
283. IRC § 751(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 37).
284. McKee, Partnerships at 23-25 (cited in note 138).
285. IRC § 751(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 37).
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The clearest examples of this analysis are the recapture items.
Depreciated or depleted property such as section 1245286 property,
or mines, or oil and gas property, may generate ordinary income
upon their disposition. The time of receipt of that income at a date
later than the death of the partner precludes it from IRD treat-
ment. The root IRD principle of income earned but not realized
cannot apply to income not yet earned. Consequently, because all
of the items listed in the flush language of section 751(c) 8 7 are
unearned at the time of death, none of the items can be IRD.258 In
the context of the A and A partnership, farm land is not IRD be-
cause it does not represent income that has been earned but not
yet paid on the death of Arachne. Acordingly, there can be no IRD
to Arachne's successor in interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
The functional approach to non-tax partnership theory ad-
vanced by scholars such as Professor Weidner has a corollary in
the tax arena as well. Just as each state must decide whether en-
tity or aggregate theory best describes and supports a desirable
partnership result, so too the Code must choose between those two
theories based upon which theory best serves the function of the
partnership. In other words, the chief question to be asked in both
tax and non-tax partnership circumstances concerns the purpose of
the partnership vis-a-vis a particular partnership transaction. Res-
olution of that question in the tax context is governed by a set of
principles that supersedes the foundational issues of entity and ag-
gregate partnership theory.
The death of a partner requires an analysis of the individual as-
sets of a partnership if the overarching principles of income recog-
nition and its analogue, basis preservation, are to be preserved in
the partnership context. Although a partnership interest may for
many other purposes be viewed as an entity, the death of a partner
requires an aggregate analysis of the partnership interest in order
to determine whether individual assets of the partnership reflect
the four characteristics of IRD that trigger recognition of income
upon the death of a partner. Pursuant to a functional approach to
partnerships, entity theory can be seen to simply give way to supe-
286. IRC § 1245 (1986).
287. IRC § 751(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 37).
288. The flush language of section 751(c) contains items that ought to generate ordi-
nary income in the context of section 751(a) but not as IRD under section 691.
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rior and more useful principles in this circumstance. The need to
identify and preserve IRD upon the death of an individual super-
sedes the need to treat a partnership interest as an entity. Treat-
ment of the partnership as a conduit under aggregate theory per-
mits a splitting of the interest into its constituent parts. After that
splitting, each part can be examined on its own merits without
concern for any effect on the partnership entity itself.
Upon the death of a partner, the two principal theories of part-
nership law are applied in subservience to the higher order norma-
tive principle that income, earned but not recognized by any tax-
payer, may not escape taxation upon the death of the taxpayer. In
other words, income in respect of a decedent is recognized by Con-
gress, the courts and the Service as operational upon the death of
an individual, even if the amount earned by the individual must
first pass through the business association known as a partnership.
The implementation of IRD principles to unrealized receivables
in every possible partnership context has required the Tax Court
to fill in some of the gaps left by Congress.2 89 In so doing the court
rejected entity theory in favor of viewing the partnership as an ag-
gregation of partnership rights and duties, one of which is the right
to unrealized receivables. Although the court did not define unreal-
ized receivables, its application of aggregate partnership theory to
resolve the IRD question means that aggregate theory should ap-
ply throughout the analysis. Consequently, each asset susceptible
of being classified as an unrealized receivable must be examined to
see if it fits the superior category of unrealized receivable under
IRD principles. In other words, one must determine whether a spe-
cific item was earned by the decedent in her lifetime, but not yet
realized prior to her death. Upon application of that approach, it
becomes clear that the flush language of section 751(c)290 contains
no such items of earned income. Consequently, none of those items
is income in respect of a decedent.
289. Quick Trust, 54 Tax Ct at 1345; Woodhall, Tax Ct Mem Dec (P-H) 69,279 at
69-1557.
290. IRC § 751(c) (1986) (text quoted in note 37).
Vol. 31:1
